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RETIREMENT IN A DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION ERA:
MAKING THE MONEY LAST
DAVID PRATT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the great pension scholar Lefty Frizzell, "If
you've got the money, honey, I've got the time."1 Unfortunately,
with increased longevity, and an increasing reliance on defined
contribution arrangements to supplement Social Security, many
baby boomers are likely to find that they have plenty of time, but
no money.
The American population is aging, resulting in financial
pressures on Social Security and Medicare. Recent financial
catastrophes such as the sub-prime mortgage fiasco, have focused
new attention on the private pension system. These concerns are
exacerbated by the recent, and probably irreversible, trend away
from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. 2 Many
prominent and profitable U.S. companies (including I.B.M.) have
recently abandoned their defined benefit plans. Not enough
Americans receive any private pension to supplement Social
Security3 and, for many of those who do, the amount received is

*Professor of Law, Albany Law School. This article is dedicated to my son
Sam, with love and thanks.
1. LEFTY FRIZZELL, If You've Got the Money (I've Got the Time), on LISTEN
TO LEFTY (Columbia 1953).
2. See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on Planningfor Retirement, U.S.
DEP'T. OF LABOR 1 (2001), availableat www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC_1 114
01_report.html (quoting Sylvester Schieber, "In considering how to increase
coverage and participation, we must focus on the type of plan to which our
culture has driven us-401(k) plans-and quit beating our heads against a wall
trying to bring back the "good old days" of the DB plan").
3. "The percentage of people 65 and older receiving income from pensions
rose until the early 1990s, peaking at 38% in 1992. The proportion of the
elderly population receiving pension income has since fallen slightly. In 2004,
36% of people 65 and older received pension income." Patrick Purcell & Debra
Whitman, Topics in Aging: Income of Americans Age 65 and Older, 1969 to
2004 Congressional Research Service, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33387, 20
(Apr. 20, 2006), availableat http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33387_2006042
0.pdf.
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inadequate. 4 In 2004, those sixty-five and older with less than
$9,260 in income depended on Social Security for about $4 out of
every $5 of that income. 5 Pensions and asset income only
6
accounted for 7% of their income.
In addition, forty years after enactment of the Equal Pay Act,
gender differences persist. From 1980 to 2004, men ages sixty-five
and older saw an increase of 69% in median pension income from
$7,096 to $12,000 annually, but women only saw an increase of
7
41% from $4,347 to $6,141 annually.
One problem is the complexity of the federal pension laws and
8
regulations, particularly thos-e governing defined benefit plans.
9
The nondiscrimination rules (and the related minimum coverage
rules)1° have now become so complex that few pension
professionals have more than a general understanding of how they
operate in practice. Plan sponsors tend to be completely
befuddled. 1
4. "Among people 65 and older who received pension income, the mean
annual amount (in 2004 dollars) rose from $8,848 in 1975 to $13,953 in 2004,
an increase of 58% or 1.5% per year." Id. at 20-21.
5. Id. at 22.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 25.
8. See, e.g., Overview of Present-Law Rules Relating to Qualified Pension
Plans, JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N. (JCX-30-98) (May 4, 1998) (stating that the

federal pension laws "are recognized as among the most complex set of rules
applicable to any area of the tax law.").
The only way to learn the rules of this Game is to take the usual
prescribed course, which requires many years; and none of the initiates
could ever possibly have any interest in making these rules easier to
learn .

.

. These rules, the sign language and grammar of the Game,

constitute a kind of highly developed secret language...
Alvin D. Lurie, Of Sticks But Not Carrots:A Process Made More Awry, 8 AM. J.
OF TAX POL'Y 69, 71-72 (1989) (quoting Herman Hesse).
9. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4)-(5)(2000); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-0 to 13 (1954).
10. I.R.C. § 410(b) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)-0 to 10 (1954).
11. See Pamela Perun & C. Eugene Steuerle, Reality Testing for Pension
Reform, URBAN INST. 1, 2 (2003), availableat http://www.urban.org/Uploaded

PDF/410797 reality-testing-pensionreform.pdf (quoting Dave Barry).
I'm staring at documents that make no sense to me, no matter how
many beers I drink. . . . Apparently I have until Sept. 30 (in most
instances) . . . to comply with something (but what?) called "GUST" . . .
[for my Keogh plan and I] . . . must adopt EGTRRA prior to the end of
the plan year beginning in 2002. I am, frankly, reluctant to adopt
anything called "EGTRRA," which sounds like the name of a giant
radioactive chicken that destroys Tokyo ... the federal Tax Code is out
of control ....
It's gigantic and insanely complex, and it gets worse all
the time. Nobody has ever read the whole thing. IRS workers are afraid
to go into the same ROOM with it. They keep it locked in the basement,
and once a day, they open the door, heave in a live taxpayer-some poor
slob who failed to adopt EGTRRA in time to comply with GUST (and
various other amendments)-then slam the door shut, before the
screams start.

2008]

Retirement in a Defined ContributionEra

1093

Complaints about complexity are not a recent phenomenon.
Over sixty years ago, after enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942,
one commentator wrote that the result of the legislation was
"provisions so complicated that they are difficult to read and in
some respects so vague that they may be hard to apply." 12 At that
time, there were only four basic plan qualification requirements
set out in the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"): today, there are
3
thirty-six.'
The Joint Committee on Taxation has pointed to the ongoing
conflict between retirement policy and tax policy:
[r]etirement income policy would argue for laws and regulations
that do not unduly hinder the ability or the willingness of an
employer to establish a retirement plan. . . tax policy requires a
balancing of the tax benefits provided to an employer who maintains
a qualified plan in relation to all other tax subsidies provided by the
Federal tax laws ....
This balancing has led the Congress (1) to
limit the total amount of benefits that may be provided to any one
employee by a qualified plan and (2) to adopt strict
nondiscrimination rules to prevent highly compensated employees
from receiving a disproportionate amount of the tax subsidy
4
provided with respect to qualified pension plans.'

As a result of federal legislation enacted in 2001,15 there is
now almost total portability of assets between all types of defined
16
contribution plans. In general, any "eligible rollover distribution"
from a tax-favored retirement plan, including an individual
retirement account (IRA), may be rolled over into any other such
Id.
12. John W. Drye, Jr., Pension and Other Deferred Compensation Plans
under Section 162 of the Revenue Act of 1942, 2 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX'N. 48,
50 (1943).
13. I.R.C. § 401(a)(1)-(36) (2000).
14. Overview of Present Law Tax Rules Relating to Qualified Pension Plans,
JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N. (JCX-30-98) (May 4, 1998).
15. See The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
("EGTRRA"), Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, 118-28 (2001) (expanding
portability of assets between all types of contribution plans).
16. Any distribution is an eligible rollover distribution, except (A) Any
distribution which is one of a series of substantially equal periodic payments
(not less frequently than annually), made (i) for the life (or life expectancy) of
the employee or the joint lives (or joint life expectancies) of the employee and
the employee's designated beneficiary, or (ii) for a fixed period of 10 years or
more; (B) A required minimum distribution (RMD) under Internal Revenue
Code section 401(a)(9); or (C) A hardship distribution. See I.R.C. § 402(c)(4)
(1986) (paraphrasing the I.R.C).
Under the regulations, the following are also not eligible rollover
distributions: (1) Certain corrective distributions, (2) unpaid loans from the
plan that are treated as deemed distributions; (3) dividends paid on employee
securities held by an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP); and (4) the
taxable cost of life insurance protection under a qualified plan. Treas. Reg. §
1.402(c)-2.
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plan which accepts such transfers. 17 Accordingly, the main focus of
attention with respect to defined contribution plans is to increase
the number of employees who are covered by a plan, to increase
account balances, particularly for middle-and low-income
employees, and to reduce the amount of pre-retirement leakage
from the retirement system.
The growing importance of defined contribution plans and
IRAs (including rollover IRAs) as a source of retirement income
raises concerns as to the management and distribution of those
funds:
The accumulation of these assets in individual retirement accounts
raises important questions for the next step in retirement securitythe distribution of these assets. Will retirees be able to manage
these assets in a manner so as not to outlive them? Do individuals
understand that life expectancy is an average, and not a definite
number of years that any given person will live? Are individuals
aware of and/or do they understand products such as annuities that
insure against longevity risk? The answers to these questions, as
well as others, will determine if the build-up of these assets in IRAs
ultimately will be successful in providing Americans security in
retirement. It is not just the accumulation of assets, but also the
appropriate spending of the assets that will determine whether
Americans with IRAs and other retirement savings will be able to
afford to maintain a comfortable retirement. 18
II. INADEQUATE PENSION PROVISION 19
A. Inadequate Coverage
As the Aspen Institute noted in a recent report, the U.S.
personal savings rate is at its lowest point since the Great
Depression. 20 Of the lowest 20% of households (in terms of income)
only 10% own tax-favored retirement accounts, compared to 85% of
the top 20% households. 21 The median value of the accounts of
the bottom 20% is $4,500, compared to $130,000 median for the

17. I.R.C. §§ 402(c)(1) (2000); 403(b)(8); 408(d)(3)(A), (D); 457(e)(16)(B).
18. Craig Copeland, IRA Assets, Contributions,and Market Share, 28 EBRI
NOTES 1, 12 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_
Notes_01-20071.pdf.
19. See generally Patrick J. Purcell, Order Code RL 30122, Pension
Sponsorship and Participation:Summary of Recent Trends, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. (Sept. 6, 2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.comlrpts/RL30122
_20070906.pdf.
20. Lisa Menash, et al., Initiative on FinancialSecurity, Savings For Life: A
Pathway -To Financial Security For All Americans, 2008 THE ASPEN INST. 1,
11, available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B4EC8-8F84-8DF23CA&704F5%7D/Savings forLife.pdf.
21. Id.
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top 20%.22
Tax expenditures for private retirement plans, including
IRAs, totaled one quarter of total annual Social Security
contributions, $114 billion in 2004. 23 Federal spending in the
form of tax expenditures for 401(k) plans is expected to grow 28%
by 2009 while that for traditional plans is expected to fall by
2.1%.24

In the past, most reform proposals have focused on expanding
coverage under the private retirement system, but those attempts
have failed, repeatedly. "Only about fifty percent of the privatesector workforce has access to work-based retirement plans at any
point in their working lives- a percentage that has varied little for
decades." 25 Workers, who earn less than $40,000 per year, are
dramatically less likely to have access to retirement plans. 26 The
number of employees with access to retirement plans fell from 52.5
million in 2005 to 51.2 million in 2006.27 The number of those
participating in plans fell from forty six million in 2000 to forty
two million in 2006. By way of comparison, coverage rates by
occupational schemes in the European Union in 2000 ranged from
less than 10% in Greece and Portugal to 90% in Sweden and the
28
Netherlands.
Several factors are closely correlated with coverage, including
union membership, firm size, 29 age, 30 and earnings:
In 2006, 70.9% of year-round, full-time workers in the private sector
with annual earnings in the top quartile were employed by firms

22. Id.
23. Teresa Ghilarducci, The Changing Role of Employer Pensions: Tax
Expenditures, Costs, and Implications for Middle-Class Elderly 4 (The Levy
Economic Institute of Bard College, Working Paper No. 469, Aug. 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=906607 (follow "go to Document
Download" hyperlink; then choose a deliverer).
24. Id.
25. Menash, supra note 20, at 25.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Study on Pension Schemes of the Member States of the European Union,
INT'L. MKT. DIRECTORATE-GEN. 25, 38, 49, 62, (May 2000), available at
http://www.efrp.org/downloads/eupublications/may2000.pdf.
29. Id.
Only 22.9% of workers at firms with fewer than twenty-five
employees participated in an employer-sponsored retirement plan in 2006,
compared to 42.6% of workers at firms with twenty-five to ninety-nine
employees and 62.7% of workers at firms with one-hundred or more
employees. Id. The proportion of year-round, full-time workers who were
employed at firms that offered a retirement plan rose from 62.8% in 1990 to
66.3% in 2000, but fell to 57.2% in 2006. Purcell, supra note 19-21, at 27.
30. Young workers-ages twenty-five to thirty-four-were less likely than
middle-aged and older workers to be employed at a firm that sponsored a
retirement plan in 2006. Id. They also were less likely to participate in
retirement plans than are older workers. Id.
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that sponsored a retirement plan, and 66.7% of workers in the top
earnings quartile participated in a retirement plan.
As one witness stated to a U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL")
Working Group:
We get pension simplification, pension complication, tax reform,
high marginal rates, low marginal rates, and one thing stays
constant, and that is probably the vexing problem. All of the
interventions that have been tried and all of the external forces that
have influenced us over the last 20 years, it hasn't budged the
31
pension coverage rate more than a percentage or two.
B. InadequateBenefits
At the same time, retirement income adequacy for most
Americans has suffered a downward trend, despite the
exceptionally healthy economy throughout the 1990s:
In 1998, every group of near-retirees except those at the very top
lost ground compared with their counterparts in 1983. The
contraction of traditional defined benefit pension plans and their
replacement by defined contribution plans appears to have helped
rich, older Americans but hurt a large group of lower-income
32
Americans.
According to one recent study, the shift from defined benefit
to defined contribution pension plans has reduced pension wealth
and income; and between 1992 and 2004, the average household
age fifty-one to fifty-six saw a decline in total pension wealth of
about 10%, and a decline in pension replacement rates from 32%
to 26%.3
C. Employers That Do Not Offer a Pension Plan
In the United States, as in European countries, there is a
mandatory social insurance system, Social Security that provides
retirement, death and disability benefits to workers, self-employed
individuals and their families. Employers have no obligation to
offer a supplemental plan. In 1981, a Presidential Commission
recommended a Minimum Universal Pension System (MUPS) for

31. See Report of the Working Group on Increasing Pension Coverage,
Participationand Benefits, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC_11 14a0lreport.htm (quoting Richard

Hinz).
32. News Release, Edward N. Wolff, Retirement Insecurity: The Income
Shortfalls Awaiting the Soon-to-Retire, ECON. POLICY INST. (2002), available at
http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/press- releases wolff0502 02b.
33. Olga Sorokina et al., Pension Wealth and Income: 1992, 1998, and 2004,
CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE 1-5, (Jan. 2008) available at
http://crr.bc.edulimages/stories/Briefs/ib8_l.pdf?phpMyAdmin=43ac483c4de9
t5ld9eb4l.
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all workers, funded by employer contributions equal to 3% of pay,
34
but the recommendation has never come close to being enacted.
In the present political climate, it is highly unlikely that any
mandated pension proposal will receive serious consideration.
Mandated pensions, like other benefit mandates, are vehemently
opposed by small businesses, where most of the gaps in pension
35
coverage exist.
In any event, if additional retirement benefits were to be
mandated, it would be far simpler and more cost-effective to
increase Social Security benefits, rather than requiring each
employer to set up a separate plan to supplement Social Security.
In the present climate of hostility toward Social Security, and
concern as to how to finance the current benefits, this outcome is
extremely unlikely.
Public-sector workers have traditionally had pension
coverage. "In 1993, 91% of the 18.6 million federal, state and local
government employees worked for agencies that sponsored pension
plans, [and 77%] of all workers were actually covered." 36 By
contrast, many private-sector employers (primarily smaller
employers) do not offer any type of supplemental pension plan to
their employees.
According to the 2002 Small Employer Retirement Survey
(SERS) (involving employers with five to one hundred full-time
workers), the most commonly cited "most important" reasons for
having a plan were competitive advantage in recruitment and
retention, positive effect on employee attitude and performance,
and tax advantages for employees. The most commonly cited "most
important" reasons for not having a plan were: employees prefer
wages and/or other benefits; revenue is too uncertain to commit to
a plan; a large portion of workers are seasonal, part time or high
34. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, Coming of Age: Toward
a NationalRetirement Income Policy, 1981 GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE 131.
All employees over the age of 25, with one year of service and 1,000
hours of employment with their employer would be participants in the
system. Vesting of benefits would be immediate... Those employers who
do not wish to administer an employee pension plan could send their
contributions to the portability clearinghouse within the Social Security
Administration. These funds would be transferred to a central MUPS
portability fund which would be established to invest the funds in the
economy. The fund should be administered by an independent Board of
Trustees appointed by the President.

Id.
35. See, e.g., Frank S. Swain & Lynne L. Garbose, Mandated Pensions: The

Next Hurdle for Small Businesses, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. 207,
212 (1987).
36. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, FINANCING THE RETIREMENT OF
FUTURE GENERATIONS, THE PROBLEM AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE, PUBLIC
POLICY MONOGRAPH, NO. 1, 10, (1998) available at http://www.actuary.org/pd

f/pension/retirement.pdf.
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turnover; required company contributions are too expensive; and it
37
costs too much to set up and administer a plan.
According to the 2000 Small Employer Retirement Survey:
Small employers that offer retirement plans tend to have higher
revenues than those that do not have retirement plans. They are
less likely to be a family-owned business. These differences persist
even when sponsors and nonsponsors of similar sizes are
compared.... Employees in companies without plans tend to be
younger, have lower earnings, have less formal education, and
38
remain with the company for less time.

Employers that do not currently sponsor plans could be
encouraged to offer plans by a combination of educational outreach
and economic incentives. Similarly, educational outreach efforts
and economic incentives could also be targeted at employees of
non-sponsoring employers, to encourage them to ask their
employers to make a plan available. 39 However, in an era of
increasing income inequality, when the average worker is less well
off than he or she was thirty years ago, and even families with
two-full time workers find it hard to make ends meet, how can we
realistically expect lower-income workers to set aside funds for
their future retirement needs, rather than current needs (food,
4°
housing, health insurance, etc.)?
Those employers that are not willing to contribute to the cost
of providing pensions should at least be required to facilitate tax-

37. Most Small Businesses Unaware of New Tax Law Incentives to Sponsor
a Retirement Plan, SMALL EMPLOYER RET. SURVEY 1, 2 (2002), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/pr596.pdf.
38. Small Employers Without Plans, EBRI SMALL EMPLOYER RETIREMENT
SURVEY 1 (2002), availableat http://ebri.com/pdf/ surveys/sers/2002/O2sersfl.p
df.
39. See id. (concluding that:
[L]ong-term efforts to increase coverage among small employers have
the greatest potential for success if they include: education of workers,
so that they view retirement planning and saving as a personal priority
and communicate their desire for a retirement plan to their employer;
ongoing good economic conditions, so that business profits and the
affordability of plan sponsorship improve; and policy approaches such as
simplification and tax credits that help make plans more affordable.).
40. News Release, 18th Annual Retirement Confidence Survey, EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS

RESEARCH

INST.

(Apr.

9,

2008),

available

at

http://ebri.com/pdf/PR_796a-09Apr08.pdf. When asked what they think is the
most pressing financial issue facing most Americans today, only 5% of workers
4% of retirees cited saving or planning for retirement. Id. Instead, they listed
making ends meet or the cost of living (17% of workers, 19% of retirees);
paying for health insurance or medical expenses (16% of workers, 25% of
retirees); making mortgage payments or paying for housing (16% of workers,
10% of retirees); paying down debt or loans (13% of workers, 5% of retirees);
fuel or energy costs (9% of workers and retirees); and job uncertainty (6% of
workers, 8% of retirees). Id.
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favored retirement savings by making available to their employees
voluntary payroll deductions for retirement savings and
forwarding those savings to an appropriate pension provider. 41
"Only 14% of US households contributed to IRAs in 2006,... [but
IRAs are owned] by forty six million households and hold more
42
than $4.6 trillion in assets."
D. Workers Who Are Not Eligible to
Participatein Their Employers'Plans
The Treasury regulations implementing the coverage and
nondiscrimination rules 4 3 are exceptionally complex, and often
require detailed numerical computations. They reflect a change to
supposedly objective mathematical tests from the facts and
circumstances approach that prevailed before enactment of the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 86").
Many workers are not eligible to participate in their
employers' plans, for any of several reasons. First, they may not
yet be eligible to participate. Generally, the employer may require
attainment of age twenty-one and completion of one year of service
with the employer before the employee is covered by the plan, and
coverage is then prospective only. 44 For the typical employee who
changes jobs several times during a working career, the
requirement to satisfy a waiting period with each new employer
will result in several years of no pension coverage. 45
For this purpose, and also for vesting purposes, a year of
service is generally defined as a twelve month period in which the
employee is credited with at least 1,000 paid hours (working or

41. See, e.g., Mike Zapler, Bill Would Give Workers Savings Plan, Targets
Those Who Lack 401(k), SAN JOSE MERcURY NEWS (Apr. 10, 2008).
[California] workers who aren't offered a retirement plan by their
employers would be able to set up a 401(k)-style account through the
state of California, under a proposal unveiled by a Democratic lawmaker
and backed by Gov. Schwarzenegger ....

Assembly Bill 2940 would

make California the first state to open its public retirement plan to
workers in the private sector, although several other states are
considering the idea ....

Employers could choose to provide matching

investments. Workers would be able to carry the accounts from job to
job.

Id.
42. IRA Savers PreservingIRA Assets As Long As Possible: ICI Study, CCH
PENSION AND BENEFITS NEWS (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://hr.cch.com/ne
ws/pension/021408a.asp.
43. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(4)-0 to -13, 1.410(b)-0 to -10 (1954).
44. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, I.R.C. § 410(a), as
amended ("ERISA") § 202(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000).
45. In January, 2004, 23% of workers had a year or less of tenure with their
current employer. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, Employee Tenure
Summary, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR (Sept. 21, 2004), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news. release/History/tenure09212004.txt.
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non-working). 46 Accordingly, permanent part-time or seasonal
employees may never become eligible or, if eligible, may never
acquire vested rights. In both the public and private sectors, there
is a major difference in coverage between part-time and full-time
47
employees.
Second, the employer is not required to include all of its
employees in the plan, even if they have satisfied the age and
service eligibility requirements described above. Participation may
be limited to certain categories of employees (e.g., salaried
employees) or to certain divisions or locations of the employer. In
general, an employer may exclude at least 30% of its non-highly
compensated employees (NHCEs) from plan participation for
almost any reason. 48 A qualified plan must cover a minimum
percentage of the employer's NHCEs. 49 The minimum percentage
is determined by reference to the percentage of highly
compensated employees (HCEs) who benefit under the plan.
Assume that an employer has one thousand NHCEs. The
pension plan requires an employee to have one year of service and
to attain age twenty one before he or she is eligible to participate,
and two hundred of these employees have not yet satisfied these
requirements. The plan will qualify if it covers at least 560 (70% of
800) of the NHCEs. If the plan covers only 50% of the employer's
HCEs, then the plan need only cover 280 (70% of 50% of 800) of
0
the NHCEs.5
The current 70% threshold-though sanctioned by long
usage-is too low. Why should an employer be able to exclude at
least 30% of its non-excludable employees-as well as all of its
excludable employees-for any reason it chooses? 5 1 At a

46. I.R.C. § 410(a)(3), ERISA § 202(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(3) (as
amended 2006).
47. According to a 1998 study, only 12% of part-time workers in the private
sector participated in pension plans, versus 50% of full-time workers. Am.
Academy of Actuaries, Trends in Retirement Income Security, POLICY
MONOGRAPH 1 (1998), availableat www.actuary.org. In the public sector, 30%
of part-timers were covered in 1993, while 85% of full-time workers were
covered. Id.
48. The exclusion may not, however, violate the laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender, race, age or disability.
49. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(3), 410(b). The minimum coverage rules were originally
enacted in 1942. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, §165(a)(3), added by The
Revenue Act of 1942, § 162, 56 Stat. 798, 862.
50. I.R.C. § 410(b).
51. Michael W. Melton, Making the Nondiscrimination Rules of TaxQualified Retirement PlansMore Effective, 71 B.U. L. REV. 47, 107 (1991).
[]t is not clear why any ratio less than one hundred percent is
acceptable in noncontributory plans ....

If participation by the lower-

and middle-income employees is the primary justification for the tax
expenditure created by the special treatment afforded qualified plans,
then no policy justifies allowing the exclusion of thirty percent or more
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Congressional hearing in 1942, a Treasury official said that the
52
70% threshold was selected because it was "reasonable". I
support the position taken by Daniel Halperin and Alicia Munnell:
generally, a qualified pension plan should cover all employees (in a
given line of business), and this,"[n]ondiscrimination would mean
that the same provisions cover all employees. If the plan failed this
simple test, none of the participants would be eligible for favorable
53
tax treatment."
Third, most tax-favored retirement arrangements are (and
are generally required to be) limited to employees of the firm or
firms sponsoring the plan. 54 Thus, if the worker is an independent
contractor rather than an employee, he or she is not allowed to
participate.
Nearly one-third of the workforce is in "non-standard" jobs; parttime, temporary, contract worker, or self-employed. This "free
agency" workforce makes traditional pension coverage less
55
adequate, especially for working mothers.
These problems should be addressed by tightening the
employee coverage rules. In particular, (1) The 70% rule, which
has been in effect since 1942, makes no sense and should be
repealed. Employers should be required to cover all employees who

of these workers from noncontributory plans.
Id.
52. See Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 at 2407 (1942) (quoting Randolph
Paul, Special Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury). The Treasury
apparently did consider requiring 100% coverage but believed such a
requirement would be too stringent. Id. at 1-17 (1942) (quoting Hon. Henry
Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury).
53. Daniel I. Halperin & Alicia H. Munnell, How the Pension System
Should Be Reformed, Brookings Institution Conference on ERISA After 25
Years: A Framework for Evaluating Pension Reform (Sept. 1999); see also
Collins, Reviving Defined Benefit Plans: Analysis and Suggestions for Reform,
20 VA. TAX REV. 599 (2001) (stating that:
[p]lans should be required to cover all employees, including part-time
employees, but with retention of modified QSLOB rules. As a trade-off
for this extension of coverage, employers should be permitted to exclude
employees from participating in the plan until they complete two years
of service, rather than the one year of service rule currently in effect
under Code section 410(a) and used by most employers.)
54. The only significant exceptions to this rule, found in the opening words
of § 401(a), are self-employed individuals (who are treated as employees by
§ 401(c) and leased employees (as defined in § 414(n)).
55. Report of the Working Group on Increasing Pension Coverage,
Participationand Benefits, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
www.dol.gov/ebsa/ publications/AC_1114a0lreport.html.
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are at least twenty one years old and have completed a short
period of service (somewhere between 30 and 90 days). (2) The
number of hours of service required for eligibility and vesting
should be reduced from 1,000 to no more than 250.
E. Eligible Employees Who Do Not Participate
When ERISA was enacted in 1974, relatively few plans
required employee contributions as a condition of participation.
Outside the governmental sector, where contributory plans are
still the norm, contributory defined benefit plans were (and are)
very rare. Some employers maintained contributory defined
contribution plans (often called thrift plans), but the vast majority
of plans were funded entirely by the employer.
This picture has changed dramatically since the 1978
enactment of section 401(k) of the Code. Originally seen as a way
to supplement benefits provided by another plan (typically a
defined benefit plan), 401(k) plans have become the dominant type
of retirement plan in the United States, at the same time as the
number of defined benefit plans has steadily declined.
Under some 401(k) plans, the amount of the employer
contribution for an employee is independent of whether, or how
much, the employee voluntarily contributes to the plan. Thus, for
instance, the plan may provide that the employer will contribute
annually, for each eligible employee, 5% of his or her compensation
for the year. However, under the vast majority of 401(k) plans, at
least part of the employer contribution is a matching contribution
which is made only for employees who have agreed to contribute
their own funds, so that employees who do not contribute do not
receive any matching contributions.
The matching contribution approach is attractive to
employers for three major reasons. First, many employers believe
that the cost of saving for retirement should be, and should be
seen to be, shared between the employer and the employee.
Second, the contributions by the employees reduce the cost to the
employer of providing a given level of retirement benefits. Third,
the availability of matching contributions is one of the best ways
to encourage employees (particularly lower-paid employees) to
contribute their own funds, which is desirable from a retirement
planning viewpoint and is also generally necessary to the
qualification of the 401(k) arrangement.
A rational employee who can afford to do so should contribute
at least the amount which will entitle him or her to receive the
maximum available matching contribution from the employer. 56

56. For instance, under a common matching formula the employer agrees to
make a 50% matching contribution on employee contributions up to 6% of pay,
so that the maximum available matching contribution is 3% of pay. Here, it
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However, some are unwilling, or feel unable, to do so. 5 Employee
participation in 401(k) plans has for some time averaged in the
mid-70% range,58 but participation rates are 80% or higher in
59
plans with a 100% employer match.
Research has shown that educational efforts on the part of
plan sponsors can improve participation and contribution rates in
401(k) plans. 60 However, when the effectiveness of employer
education is judged by subsequent investment behavior, rather
than intentions following the seminar, the success is more
61
limited.
Participants' desire for financial assistance is clear. In a 2006
survey, over three-quarters of those surveyed stated that they
would like expert investment advice. Close to the same proportion
wanted an expert to "support and affirm their investment
decision." However, the survey also found that less than half of
individuals who are offered financial planning or investment
62
advisory services by their employer actually use them.

would be rational for the employee to contribute 6% of pay, and the survey
evidence confirms that many employees do exactly that.
57. In 2005, according to a study by Hewitt Associates, 42.5% of
participants aged 20 to 29 contributed under 5% of pay, compared to 35.6% in
2004. Hewitt Associates, How Well Are Employees Saving and Investing in
401(k) Plans, 2006 Hewitt Universe Benchmarks (2005). Nearly 40% of
participants with less than one year of tenure contributed under 5% of pay,
compared to 35.4% in 2004. Id. Almost half (49.4%) of participants earning
less than $20,000 per year contributed under 5% of pay versus 40% in 2004.
Id. 21.8% of participants did not contribute enough to obtain the full company
match. Id. Approximately 30% of participants contributed only enough to
their plan to obtain the full employer match. Id.
58. Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Hewitt Research Shows U.S.
Employees Not Interacting with 401(k) Plan for Optimal Benefit, (July 8,
2002), availableat http://was.hewitt.com.
59. Report of the Working Group on Planningfor Retirement, U.S. DEP'T. OF
LABOR (Nov. 14, 2001), availableat
www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC_1114
01_ report.html.
60. Society of Actuaries, Financial Education and Retirement Savings,
Conference Proceedings from the Retirement Implications of Demographic and
Family Change Symposium (2002).
61. ADVANTAGE BENEFITS GROUP, Advice Efforts by Providers Go Unused,
available at http://www.advantageben.com/Advice%20Efforts%20by%20
Providers%20Go%20Unused.pdf.
Although retirement plan providers supply investment education
materials to 56% of participants surveyed by Spectrem Group, only 12%
said they refer to these materials on a regular basis and 22% never use
them ....

Procrastination was given as the primary reason participants

do not utilize investment advice arrangements. According to the study
report, 61% of respondents stated they simply have not gotten around to
it.

Id.
62. Julie Agnew, Personalized Retirement Advice and Managed Accounts:
Who Uses Them and How Does Advice Affect Behavior in 401(k) Plans?, (CRR
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Research also demonstrates the influence of plan design on
63
savings and asset allocation decisions. For example, a 2004 paper
indicates that the probability of participation falls as the number
of investment choices increases, suggesting that individuals may
be susceptible to choice overload:
While people generally value the ability to choose, it is recognized
that having to choose complicates any decision and may even reduce
their ability to make rational decisions.... Researchers have now
begun to quantify the effects of "choice overload" as it relates to
retirement plan participation, finding that for every 10 funds added
to a plan the predicted participation rate drops by 2%.64
A General Accounting Office report 65 found that a majority of
persons without pension coverage had at least one of the following
characteristics: low income, part-time employment, employment at
small firms, or youth. The report found a strong correlation
between having one or more of these traits and either not wanting
coverage or being unable to save for retirement. A Department of
Labor Working Group concluded that:
Significant reasons why more employees do not participate in
pension plans sponsored by their employers include: the growing
predominance of elective plans over traditional defined benefit plans
that provide automatic coverage; employees give cash wages a
higher priority than pension coverage; employees give health
insurance a higher priority than pension coverage; a lack of
personalized information or knowledge; inertia and fear;
employment patterns; a sense that pension coverage is unnecessary
or futile; the lack of the incentive of an employer matching
contribution; and the lack of tax incentives for lower income
66
workers.

Working Paper 2006-9, Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College 2006).
63. Sethi-Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang, How Much Choice is Too Much?
Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in Pension Design and Structure:
New Lessons From Behavioral Finance (Pension Research Council Working
Paper 2004, 83-95).
64. Shlomo Benartzi, Implications of ParticipantBehavior for Plan Design,
ALLIANCE BERNSTEIN INV. (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.allianceberns

tein.com/CmsObjectABD/PDF/ResearchWhitePaper/R29284 Implications_01
31_WP.pdf.
65. PENSION PLANS: CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE
WITHOUT PENSION COVERAGE, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE GAO/HEHS-

00-131 (2000), available at http://www. gao.gov/archive/2000/heOO131.pdf.
66. REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INCREASING PENSION COVERAGE,
PARTICIPATION AND BENEFITS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Nov. 13, 2001), available

at

www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/AC1114a0 lreport.html;

see

also

Retirement Plan Participationand Features, and the Standard of Living of
Americans 55 or Older, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 248 (Aug. 2002), available at
www.ebri.org. (stating that "[t]he predominant reason for choosing not to

participate was that doing so was unaffordable.").
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Many employees are insufficiently aware of the need to plan;
Employees need to be more educated about the importance of
planning for retirement and employers also need to overcome the
employees' inertia by careful plan design. 67 Plans should be
designed to automatically enroll participants, adopt higher default
contribution rates, provide default investment funds with higher
expected rates of return, and implement pre-commitment
mechanisms for future contributions. 68
In 2005, the average participation rate for plans with
automatic enrollment was fourteen percentage points higher,
compared to plans across the entire Hewitt Associates database.
With automatic enrollment, participation was thirty percentage
points higher for workers with less than one year of tenure, and
twenty-one percentage points higher for workers with less than
$20,000 in annual salary. For workers aged twenty to twenty-nine,
participation was 22% higher under automatic enrollment.
However, despite these improvements, enrollment for younger,
lower-tenured, and lower-salaried workers remained relatively
low. Nearly three quarters of workers in their forties and fifties
contributed in 2005, but only 47.5% of workers in their twenties.
Only 39% of eligible workers with salaries less than $20,000
participated, and 61% of eligible workers earning $20,000 to
$39,999 participated. 69 Section 902 of the Pension Protection Act of
2006 ("PPA") includes provisions to encourage automatic
enrollment programs, generally effective for plan years beginning
after December 31, 2007. It is too early to assess the effect of this
change.
Until recently, an employer that sponsored a 401(k) plan
generally had a strong incentive to encourage its lower-paid
employees to save under the plan, because the maximum rate of
savings available to highly compensated employees was
determined by the average savings rate of the non-highly
compensated employees. 70 Now, however, an employer can adopt a
safe-harbor plan design that is automatically deemed to satisfy
this test, even if no rank-and-file employee saves a dollar under
the plan. There are two safe harbor plan designs: (1) The employer
makes a fully vested, nonelective contribution of at least 3% of pay

67. Alicia H. Munnell, et al., What Determines 401(k) Participation and
Contributions?, (Boston College Ctr. for Ret. Research Working Paper No.
2000-12).
68. James Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian and Andrew Metrick,
How to Increase 401(k) Saving, www.nber.org/aginghealth/fall02/40lkSaving
.html.
69. Hewitt Associates, How Well Are Employees Saving and Investing in
401(k) Plans (2006), availableat http://www.hewittassociates.com/_MetaBas
icCMAssetCache_/Assets/Articles/40lk2OO6Benchmarks.pdf.
70. I.R.C. § 401(k).
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for each participant, regardless of whether the participant elects to
contribute; or (2) The employer makes a fully vested, matching
contribution for each participant who elects to contribute. The
matching contribution must be at least equal to (i) 100% of the
participant's deferrals up to 3% of pay, plus (ii) 50% of deferrals
between 4% and 5% of pay, so that a participant who defers at
least 5% of pay will receive a matching contribution of at least 4%
71
of pay.
It is not yet clear whether these safe harbor designs will
reduce the level of employee savings. For many employees, the
safe harbor employer contributions, in addition to being vested
immediately, are larger than the employer contributions made
previously.
However, the concern is that the employer,
particularly if it adopts the matching contribution safe harbor, no
longer has an incentive to encourage employees to contribute: in
fact, from a strictly financial viewpoint, the less the employees
contribute, the less the cost will be to the employer.
Employees should be encouraged to participate by a
combination of educational outreach 72 and economic incentives. In
2001, The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 ("EGTRRA") enacted a non-refundable tax credit, for lowerincome individuals who contribute to an IRA or an employersponsored retirement plan. 73 The maximum credit is 50% of
retirement contributions up to $2,000. As originally enacted, the
credit expired after the 2006 tax year.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA") made the credit
permanent and provided for the eligible income brackets to be
indexed for inflation.7 4 However, "[b]ecause it is non-refundable,

71. I.R.C. § 401(k)(12).
72. See Olivia Mitchell and Stephen Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral
Financefor Retirement Plan Design, 32-37 (Pension Research Council Working
Paper 2003-6, 2003) (suggesting that "the current education model in 401(k)
is
plans may have reached its effective limits" and concluding that "[i]t
because retirement savings decisions are at least an order of magnitude more
complex than other economic decisions, that people need help"); see also Victor
Saliterman & Barry G. Sheckley, Adult Learning Principles and Pension
ParticipantBehavior, (Pension Research Council Working Paper 2003-17, 2,
2003) (suggesting that
participants who receive information about their retirement savings in
accord with research-based principles of how adults learn best, will
markedly increase contributions to their retirement plans. Educational
activities that are learner-centered guide participants through a recognition of how they can use information about investment options to
devise effective financial plans. Activities that engage participants as

active, self-determining individuals who will benefit from assistance
that helps them to reflect upon, make informed choices about, and take
control of their retirement saving plans.)

73. I.R.C. § 25(B).
74. Pension Protection Act of 2006 (hereinafter "PPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-280,
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some families may not benefit from the retirement savings tax
credit because they have no net income tax liability. Also, the
credit may not be large enough to provide a savings incentive for
75
families with incomes near the upper limits."
In order to be effective, the income thresholds should be
increased, and the credit should be made refundable.
Finally, however, it may be unrealistic to expect increased
savings by employees in the short-term, given that many of them
are being required to contribute more to the cost of their health
insurance which, for most employees, particularly those with
young children, is significantly more important than future
pension benefits.
F. Vesting
Prior to the enactment of ERISA in 1974, federal pension law
did not require any vesting prior to attainment of normal
retirement age which was typically (then as now) age sixty five.
Those plans that did provide some pre-retirement vesting often
required long periods (twenty to twenty five years) of continuous
service. ERISA reduced the maximum permissible vesting period
to fifteen years (not necessarily continuous) and limited
significantly the ability of a plan to ignore service performed
76
before a relatively brief break in service.
In 1986, plans were required to provide either (1) five year
"cliff' vesting-no vesting before the completion of five years of
service and 100% vesting thereafter-or graduated vesting: 20%
after three years of service and an additional 20% for each
subsequent year, resulting in 100% vesting after seven years of
service. 77 In 2001, employer matching contributions were
subjected to faster vesting rules: either three year "cliff' vesting or
(2) graduated vesting: 20% after two years of service and an

§§ 812, 833(a), 120 Stat. 780, 1003-04 (2006); see Patrick Purcell, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., The Retirement Savings Tax Credit:A Fact Sheet 2 (2007).

75. Purcell, supra note 74, at 2; see also William G. Gale, et al., Improving
Tax Incentives for Low.Income Savers; The Savers' Credit, URBAN-BROOKINGS
TAX POLICY CTR., Discussion Paper No.22 (June 2005) (discussing the
problems with tax credits for low income families).
76. I.R.C. § 411; ERISA § 204; see also Frank V. Auriemma, et al., Graying
Teachers: A Report on State Pension Systems and School District Early
Retirement Incentives, U. of Or. Eric Clearinghouse (1992) (stating that these
vesting rules do not apply to governmental or church plans). A 1992 study

found that vesting periods for state retirement programs for teachers ranged
from three to twenty years, with five and ten years being the most common
periods. Id.
77. I.R.C. § 416. These faster vesting schedules for matching contributions
have applied since 1982 to plans classified as "top-heavy," under which more
than 60% of all plan benefits have accrued for the benefit of certain owners
and officers. Id.
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additional 20% for each subsequent year, resulting in 100%
78
vesting after six years of service.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA") subjects all
employer contributions to covered defined contribution plans to
the same vesting requirements as now apply to matching
contributions. 9 Accordingly, employer contributions must vest
under either a three-year cliff schedule or a six-year graded
schedule, beginning with 20% vesting after two years of service.
Years of service before the effective date must be taken into
account.
Despite these improvements, a significant number of plan
participants still terminate employment-often with more than
one employer during their work career, and particularly at
younger ages-before becoming fully vested, so that part or all of
their accumulated benefits is forfeited. Survey evidence indicates
that the median job tenure in the American economy in January,
2004 was about four years, 80 which is less than the number of
years of service needed for full vesting under three of the four
minimum vesting schedules (five-year cliff, three to seven year
graded and two to six year graded). About 25% of all workers had
been with their current employer for twelve months or less.81
The solution here is relatively straightforward, and much less
controversial than it would have been ten years ago: require all
employer-provided benefits to be fully vested after (at most) two
years of service. Benefits derived from employee contributions
(voluntary or mandatory) are already required to be fully vested at
all times.
G. Pre-RetirementLeakage
Almost all defined contribution plans and account-based
defined benefit plans (such as cash balance plans) distribute
benefits in a lump sum to participants who terminate employment
before retirement. An increasing number of traditional defined
82
benefit plans also do so.
78. Id.
79. PPA § 904, amending ERISA § 203 and I.R.C. § 411. The new rules are
effective for contributions for plan years beginning after December 31, 2006.
Id. The requirements do not apply to a participant until the participant has
an hour of service after the effective date. Id. There are delayed effective
dates for collectively bargained plans and certain leveraged ESOPs. Id.
80. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, Employee Tenure in 2004, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR USDL 04-1829, (Sept. 21, 2004). The median tenure in the private
sector was 3.6 years (7.0 years in the public sector). Craig Copeland, Employee
Tenure: Stable Overall, But Male and Female Trends Differ, EBRI NOTES 2

(2005).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Purcell, supra note 19, at 9. According to a 1998 Census Bureau
Survey, 82% of workers included in an employer retirement plan participated
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Available estimates suggest that the vast majority of defined
benefit plan participants who leave an employer with less than 10
years of service take a lump-sum distribution; that over half of all
defined benefit plans now offer a lump-sum distribution at
retirement; and that nearly all of the individual account defined
benefit plans ("cash-balance" plans) offer lump-sum distributions.
Many of these distributions are spent, wholly or partly, rather
than being kept in a retirement plan: the younger the recipient,
and the smaller the amount distributed, the more likely it is that
at least part of the distribution will be spent rather than saved for
83
retirement.
There are also significant problems associated with lump sum
distributions made at or after retirement age, notably the risk that
the individual will outlive his or her retirement savings.
According to a 2000 study, 68% of 401(k) plan participants
who change jobs between the ages of twenty and fifty-nine take
cash instead of rolling over their account balance.8 4 Participants
with smaller account balances are more likely to cash-out their
85
account balances than participants with larger account balances.
Part of the explanation may be that "a participant with a small
account balance, especially early in her career, fails to perceive
how large an effect cashing out that small account balance will
6
have on her ultimate retirement benefit."
If the present value of the participant's benefit under an
employer plan exceeds $5,000, the benefit may not be distributed,
prior to the later of age sixty-two or normal retirement age,
without the participant's consent.8 7 If the value of the benefit does
not exceed $5,000, the benefit may be distributed without the
participant's consent, and without complying with the annuity
rules.88 This rule sends the (wrong) message that these relatively
in a plan that offered lump sum distributions. Id.
83. Hearing on Retirement Security and Defined Benefit Pension Plans,
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee On
Ways and Means, 107th Cong. (June 20, 2002) (Statement of Dallas L.
Salisbury, President and CEO, E.B.R.I, Washington, D.C. (June 20, 2002)).
84. Press Release, Hewitt Associates, Cashing Out Your Future? Hewitt
Study Shows Majority of 401(k) Plan Participantsin U.S. Opt for Cash When
Changing Jobs, Regardless of Age (May 30, 2000) (on file with author).
85. Albert Crenshaw, Undermining Their Own Retirements, WASH. POST,
Nov. 9, 2003, at F04. A 2003 study by Hewitt Associates found 87% of workers
with account balances less than $5,000 opted to take cash. Id.
86. Susan J. Stabile, Symposium: The Behavior of Defined Contribution
Plan Participants,77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 97 (2002); see also Hewitt Associates,
supra note 84 (stating that "[a] mere 20% of distributions under $3,500 was
rolled over, whereas 95% of distributions over $100,000 was rolled over ....
The rollovers range from 26% of distributions made to individuals in their
twenties to 89% for individuals aged 60 and over.").
87. I.R.C. § 411(a)(11); ERISA § 203(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(4).
88. Id.
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small distributions are not worth bothering about. For many low
income employees, the best they can expect from the pension
system may be a series of small payouts each time they change
jobs. For instance, if a thirty year old employee receives a $5,000
cash-out and earns a 9% annual return, it will be worth $80,000 by
the time he or she reaches age sixty two. The Employee Benefit
Research Institute recently estimated that pre-retirement
withdrawals and loans reduced the median replacement rate for
the typical 401(k) plan participant in the lowest quartile from 70%
to 50%.89
Clearly, existing educational programs and tax incentives
have proved insufficient. Code section 72(t) imposes a penalty tax
on most distributions made before age fifty-nine and a half. The
tax is equal to 10% of the amount includible in income, so does not
apply to the portion of any distribution that is not currently
taxable, for instance because it is transferred to another plan.
A 10% tax is clearly not sufficient to deter premature
withdrawals, and spending, of retirement savings. One approach
would be to increase the tax significantly, but this would
disproportionately affect lower income plan participants, including
some who have immediate needs for which they must use the
money. Probably the only truly effective solution is for employersponsored retirement plans to be prohibited from making preretirement distributions. 90 The employee's vested accrued benefit
should either be kept in the plan, for deferred distribution;
transferred to a new employer's plan; or transferred to the payee's
individual retirement account (IRA). Distributions before
retirement age would be strictly limited, subject perhaps to narrow
exceptions for cases of financial hardship. 91
H. Recent Developments
Between October 2007 and March 2008, the major stock
market indices lost about 14% of their value. "For someone
retiring now with say, $500,000 in savings, that would translate
89. Sarah Holden & Jack VanDerhei, Can 401(k) Accumulations Generate
Significant Income for Future Retirees, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF 16 (Nov. 2002); see
also Gary L. Engelhardt, Pre-Retirement Lump Sum Pension Distributions
and Retirement Income Security, 55 NAT'L TAX J.665 (2002) (discussing the
impact of withdrawals on retirement security).
90. Hewitt Associates, supra note 84. The Advisory Council recommended
that, subject to a hardship exception, all lump sums in excess of $2,000 be
required to be rolled over. Id.
91. Leonard E. Burman, Norma B. Coe, & William G. Gale, What Happens
When You Show Them the Money?: Lump Sum Distributions, Retirement
Income Security, and Public Policy, URBAN INST., 35 (Nov. 1999). "When a
worker has, say, $100,000 in a pension or IRA, but loses a job and is about to
default on a mortgage, the correct policy might not be to require households to
maintain pension balances until retirement." Id.
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into a drop of about $70,000."92 Great West Retirement Services
reported a 20% increase in the number of people citing "avoiding
eviction or foreclosure" as the reason for hardship withdrawals in
January 2008, compared with January 2007. 93
In the wake of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and falling home
prices, retirement plan participants are taking out loans at an
accelerated rate. The percentage of 401(k) participants who have
94
taken a loan rose from 9% in 2005 to 18% in 2007.
Workers are more concerned about falling home prices, rising
debt, and keeping up with monthly expenses than with saving for
retirement. Some participants are taking hardship distributions,
and paying income taxes, rather than loans, 95 which has two
adverse effects: the money is no longer available for retirement
and most plans impose a six month waiting period before the
participant can recommence contributing to the plan.
In addition, as the falling real-estate and stock markets erode
their savings, many Americans are delaying retirement. 96 In
1987, property and market values dropped in tandem but nowhere
near the extent as is happening now. 97- Falls in stock value may
cause even more acute problems for employees who own large
amounts of their employer's stock through a 401(k) plan or
ESOP.gs
In the wake of these events, the percentage of workers very
confident about having enough money for a comfortable retirement
has decreased sharply, from 27% in 2007 to 18% in 2008, the
92. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Financial upheaval in U.S. reopens debate
about 401(k)s, REUTERS, Mar. 4, 2008.
93. Id.
94. More Employees Borrowing Against 401(k) Plans: With the trend toward
defined contributionplans, the decision-making has shifted from the employer
to the individual, INVEST. NEWS, March 20, 2008.
95. Christine Dugas, 401(k)s Tapped to Save Homes: But withdrawals
triggerpenalties,USA TODAY, March 11, 2008, at IA.
96. Jennifer Levitz, Americans Delay Retirement AS Housing Stocks Swoon:
Nest Eggs Shrink, Deferring Dreams; 'FreakedOut' Elite, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1,
2008.
97. Id.
98. See Jack VanDerhei et al., 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account
Balances, and Loan Activity in 2006, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 308, 1 (Aug. 2007)
at 1 (reporting that in 2006, average holdings of company stock in 401(k) plans
amounted to 11% of total assets, down from 19% in 1996. Of those in plans
with company stock as an option, 7.3% of 401(k) participants have 90 % or
more of their 401(k) assets in company stock); see also The New Retirement
Drama: ESOPs, TREASURY & RISK, Mar. 25, 2008 (stating that: "Bear Stearns
workers own 30% of the financial services company; investments that were
rendered pretty much worthless even as bidder JPMorgan Chase increased its
takeover offer five-fold to $10."). "But they aren't the only ESOP participants
concerned about their savings. Last year, 11.2 million Americans held $928
billion in employee-stock-ownership plans, stock bonus plans and profitsharing plans that primarily invest in company stock." Id.
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biggest one-year drop in the eighteen-year history of the
Retirement Confidence Survey. Retiree confidence in having a
financially secure retirement also decreased, from 41% to 29%.
The decrease in confidence occurred across all age groups and
income levels, but was particularly acute among younger workers
and those with lower incomes. 99
The percentage who are very confident of having enough
money to take care of basic expenses decreased from 40% in 2007
to 34% for workers, and from 48% to 34% for retirees.
Additionally, fewer workers are confident about having enough
money for medical expenses (43%, up from 32% in 2007) and for
long-term care expenses (54% in 2008, compared with 44% a year
100
ago).
These results are very different from those reported by AARP
in November 2007, finding that, despite being ill-prepared for
retirement, many financial decision-makers in working households
had a false sense of security. "At least half are very or somewhat
confident that they will be able to cover their basic expenses in
retirement, have enough money to live comfortably throughout
retirement, have enough money to cover medical expenses, and be
able to afford to retire when desired."10 1
III. SOURCES OF INCOME
In 2006, Social Security was the largest source of income for
those currently age sixty-five and older, accounting for 39.8 % of
their income on average. Pension and annuities income was 19.3
%, income from assets 15.4 %, and income from earnings was 23.7
%. Nearly all individuals (89.7%) age sixty-five and over were
receiving income from Social Security in 2006, while 55.3%
received income from assets, 35.4% received income from pensions
10 2
and annuities, and 18.9% received income from earnings.
In 2006, the lowest income quintile among the elderly
received 87.6% of its income from Social Security, and the highest
income quintile received 18.5% of its income from Social Security.
The other three main sources of the elderly's income (pensions and
annuities, assets, and earnings) all increased in importance for the
higher-income quintiles. In 2006, the lowest-income quintile
received 2.6% of its income from pensions and annuities, 5.3%
from assets, and 1.9% from earnings. By comparison, the highest99. Ruth Helman, et al., The 2008 Retirement Confidence Survey:
Americans Much More Worried About Retirement, Health Costs a Big Concern,
EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 316, 1 (Apr. 2008).
100. Id. at 4.

101. Colette Thayer, Preparationfor Retirement: The Haves and Have-Nots,

AARP

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (Nov. 2007).

102. Ken McDonnell, Income of the Elderly Population Age 65 and Over,
2005, EBRI NOTES 1, 2 (May 2007).
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income quintile received 22.6% of its income from pensions and
annuities, 20.5%from assets, and 36.4% from earnings.
For the two younger age groups (sixty-five through sixty-nine
and seventy through seventy-four) earnings from work increased
significantly as a source of income from 1985 to 2006. For the
youngest group (sixty five to sixty nine year olds) the increase was
most significant, increasing sixteen percentage points from 1985 to
2006. Elderly women derived a greater share of their income from
Social Security and assets than elderly men in 2006. Social
Security accounted for 47.8% of elderly women's income, compared
with 34.0% of elderly men's income. Income from assets accounted
for 17.5% of elderly women's income, compared with 13.8% of
elderly men's. By comparison, elderly men derived a larger share
of their income from employment-based sources, including
pensions and annuities and earnings, than elderly women. In
2006, pensions and annuities accounted for 21.6% of elderly men's
income, compared with 16.1% of elderly women's. Income from
earnings accounted for 28.5% of the elderly men's income,
10 3
compared with 17.1% of elderly women's.
One possible source of additional income is income from
reverse mortgages, to take advantage of the housing wealth of the
elderly. However, this market has not yet matured, and anecdotal
evidence suggests much abusive selling:
[H]undreds of people who have sought reverse mortgages- in
lawsuits, surveys and conversations with elder-care advocates- have
complained about high-pressure or unethical sales tactics they say
steered them towards loans with very high fees. Some say they were
tricked into putting proceeds of their loans into unprofitable
104
investments, while sales agents pocketed rich commissions.
Given the heavy reliance of the elderly upon Social Security,
Congress should address the appropriate thresholds for income
taxation of Social Security benefits. As recent experience with the
alternative minimum tax shows, the failure to adjust tax
thresholds for inflation can have pernicious long-term effects.
Tax provisions affecting the treatment of Social Security benefits
have not changed since 1993, but the share of Social Security
benefits included in taxable income is continually increasing under
current law because the threshold levels
for inclusion of benefits in
10 5
income are not indexed for inflation.

103. Ken McDonnell, Income of the Elderly Population Age 65 and Over,
2006, EBRI NOTES 13 (Dec. 2007).
104. Charles Duhigg, Tapping Into Homes Can Be Pitfall for the Elderly,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, at Al.
105. Barbara A. Butrica et al., How the Income Tax Treatment of Savings
and Social Security Retirement Benefits May Affect Boomers' Retirement
Incomes, 2008 URBAN INST. 1, 13.
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The $25,000 and $32,000 thresholds were enacted in 1983,
and the $34,000 and $44,000 thresholds were added by OBRA
1993. Only 39% of beneficiaries paid taxes on their Social Security
benefits in 2000, but a growing share of beneficiaries will be
required to pay taxes on their Social Security benefits in the
future.
Another concern is that the average replacement rate of
Social Security benefits for earned income will decrease
dramatically from a consistent 40% to less than 30% by 2030. The
106
decrease will be even greater for higher income retirees.
In addition, the Medicare Part B premiums for higher-income
individuals will increase every year through 2009 to 35% of actual
Medicare costs, for single beneficiaries with $80,001 to $100,000
(indexed) of modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) and up to 80%
of actual Medicare costs for single beneficiaries with more than
$200,000 (indexed) of MAGI. These higher Medicare premiums
will reduce net Social Security benefits significantly.
IV. INCOME INEQUALITY
Another recent trend that does not bode well for future
retirement security is the growing income inequality in the United
States.
A state-by-state examination of trends in income inequality over the
past two business cycles finds that inequality has grown in most
parts of the country since the late 1980s. The incomes of the
country's highest-income families have climbed substantially, while
middle- and lower-income families have seen only modest
107
increases.
On average, incomes have declined by 2.5% among the bottom
fifth of families since the late 1990s, while increasing by 9.1 %
among the top fifth. For the richest 5%, income growth since the
late 1990s has been much faster than among the poorest fifth of
families. Families in the middle of the income distribution have
fallen farther behind upper-income families in many states since
the late 1990s. "The federal tax cuts of the early 2000s, which were
targeted primarily on wealthy families, helped widen the income
gap between the wealthiest families and those with low and
moderate incomes."1 08 Factors contributing to the growing income
gaps in most states include growth in wage inequality (the biggest
factor), expansion of investment income, and government policies.

106. Francine J. Lipman, Shrinking Boomer Social Security Retirement
Benefits, 2007 A.B.A. SEC. TAXATION NEWS QUARTERLY 27 (Fall 2007).
107. Jared Bernstein et al., Pulling Apart, A State-by-State Analysis of
Income Trends, 2008 CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 1, 7 (Apr. 2008).
108. Id. at 8.
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Government actions-and, in some cases, inaction-have contributed
to the increase in wage and income inequality in most states.
Examples include deregulation and trade liberalization, the
weakening of the social safety net, the lack of effective labor laws
regulating the right to collective bargaining, and the declining real
value of the minimum wage. In addition, changes in federal, state,
and local tax structures and benefit programs have, in many cases,
accelerated the trend toward growing inequality emerging from the
labor market. 10 9
IRS data show that federal income tax rates for the 400
taxpayers with the highest incomes have fallen from 30 % of
income in 1995 to 18% in 2005.110 The average pre-tax income of
this group rose by 235% between 1992 and 2005, after adjusting
for inflation. The average income of the top 1% of filers rose by
89% between 1992 and 2005, after adjusting for inflation. "Income
inequality, by many measures, is now greater than it has been
since the 1920's. The top 1% of earners in the United States made
19% of all income in 2005, up from 8% in 1975, according to an
analysis by Emmanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty, two
economists.""'1
V. SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE
This paper is not about Social Security and Medicare: yet how
can a paper about retirement income security not talk about the
financial condition of those two programs? The good news, slight
though it is, is that the projected cost outlook for both Social
Security and Medicare has improved relative to that described in
the 2007 trustees' reports. 112 What follows will be only a very brief
discussion of a major issue.
No one can deny that the financial condition of Social Security
must be improved. However, the "crisis" is nowhere near as severe
as alarmists would suggest. The Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities recently pointed out, again, that whereas, according to
the 2008 trustees' report, Social Security faces an estimated total
shortfall of 0.56% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) over the next
seventy five years, this is less than the estimated cost over the
same period of extending the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for only the
top 1% of households, 0.6% of GDP. Currently, households in the
top 1% make more than $450,000 per year. 113 Extending all of the

109. Id. at 10.
110. CBPP Says Tax Rates Fell For Taxpayers With Highest Incomes, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 28, 2008, (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. SSA Summarizes Annual Social Security, Medicare Trust Fund Reports
[hereinafter SSA], TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 26, 2008) (on file with author).
113. Kris Cox and Richard Kogan, Long-Term Social Security Shortfall
Smaller Than Cost Of Extending Tax Cuts For Top 1 %, CTR. ON BUDGET AND
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tax cuts (not just those for the top 1%) would cost 1.95 % of GDP,
114
three and a half times the size of the Social Security shortfall.
Medicare is a much greater crisis than Social Security. The
Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund faces a shortfall triple
the size of that facing Social Security. This is a serious problem
1 15
because of the rising costs of healthcare in America.
According to the 2008 Medicare trustees' report, the Medicare
crisis could be resolved by an immediate 122% increase in the
payroll tax to 6.44% from 2.9%, or an immediate 51% reduction in
the program's benefits or a combination of these approaches.11 6
The financial problems facing Social Security and Medicare
are not new. Congressional inaction, and acquiescence in tax cuts,
during this period displays a staggering degree of irresponsibility.
Perhaps the only bright spot is that the situation is now so bad
that reform is inevitable.
VI. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
With respect to defined benefit plans, there are two separate
problems: the general decline in the number of defined benefit
plans 1 7 and "portability losses" that result when an employee

POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 31, 2008)
114. Id.

115. Id. at 2.
116. SSA, supra note 112.
117. Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin. (PWBA), Abstract of 1997 Form
5500 Annual Reports, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Winter 2001), available at
http://www.dol.gov /ebsa/ publications /bullet97/intro.htm. According to the

U.S. Dep't of Labor ("DOL"), the number of private sector defined benefit plans
fell from 175,000 in 1983 to 63,700 in 1996 and to 59,500 in 1997, and the
number of small defined benefit plans (those with fewer than 100 participants)
fell from 149,164 in 1983 to 47,104 in 1996 and to 43,647 in 1997. Id. There
were 632,566 defined contribution plans in 1996 and 660,542 in 1997. Id.; see
also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PWBA Advisory Council, Report of the Working
Group on the Merits of Defined Contribution vs. Defined Benefit Plans, With an
Emphasis on Small Business Concerns, (Nov. 13, 1997), available at
www.dol.gov/pwba (reporting that the number of defined contribution plans
increased from 208,000 to 618,500 between 1975 and 1993); see also Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), PENSION INSURANCE DATA BOOK 1999,
PBGC SINGLE-EMPLOYER PROGRAM, NO. 4 (Summer 2000), at 33. (citing Table

S-17 which shows that the number of single-employer defined benefit plans
covered by PBGC fell from 112,208 in 1985 to 48,748 in 1996 and to 37,536 in
1999); see also Watson Wyatt, The Unfolding of a Predictable Surprise: A
Comprehensive Analysis of the Shift from Traditional Pensions to Hybrid
Plans, WATSON WYATT INSIDER (Mar. 2000) (stating that "[t]he percentage of
private sector U.S. workers covered by traditional pensions has dropped
dramatically-from 39% in 1975 to 23% in 1995. If just the same percentage of
U.S. workers were covered by defined benefit pensions today as in 1975, an
additional 16 to 20 million workers would be participating in this system than
are doing so today."); see also Portability of Defined-Benefit Pensions
(hereinafter"PDBP"),17 RECORD OF SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES 1041, 1042 (1991)
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changes jobs. One positive aspect of the conversion of many
traditional defined benefit plans to account-based defined benefit
plans is that the latter provide significantly greater accrued
benefits at younger ages. 118
According to a 1988 DOL study, portability losses are
principally experienced by shorter-service workers who are
covered under defined benefit plans, with at least 75% of all
portability losses the result of plan design characteristics.
Approximately 59% of covered workers experience some portability
loss, with the average pension loss equal to 25% of the single
career benefit. 119
Most defined benefit plans calculate the amount of the annual
pension by reference to length of service with that employer and
final average salary with that employer. Accordingly, for an
employee who has more than one employer during his or her
working career, the total pension will be lower than if he or she
had worked for only one employer, even if he or she is covered by
an identical defined benefit plan throughout. The possible
solutions to this dilemma (including cost of living adjustments to
deferred pensions, reciprocity agreements between unrelated
employers, and requiring employers to credit service with other
employers) merit further investigation. However, they all involve
cooperation between employers and/or additional pension expense
which, for the foreseeable future, is unlikely to occur.
As Steven Willborn points out, the pension portability
debate
[i]nvolves very difficult questions about the costs and distributional
effects of changes in the rules relating to portability.... Those costs
and distributional effects pose an empirical challenge: it is difficult
to determine what they are with an acceptable degree of precision.
And they pose a normative challenge: with its costs and
distributional effects, does portability provide a net benefit? ...
Second, the portability debate is difficult because any changes
affect, not only the ability of employees to transfer benefits, but also
the calculus employers make when they decide whether to offer
120
pensions as an employee benefit ....

(stating that "[t]he regulatory environment is already demotivating definedbenefit plans. Any portability legislation in this area is likely to make it
worse.").
118. Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, You Can't Take It With You: An
Examination of Employee Benefit Portabilityand Its Relationship to Job Lock
and the New Psychological Contract, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 173, 210
(2001) (citing Towers Perrin, Hot Topics, Perspectives on Cash Balance Plans:
Time Out for Facts, www.towers.com/ towers/hottops/htcbp2.htm).
119. Id. at 207 (citing Labor Department Study Describes Impact of Job
Mobility on Pensions, 15 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1152 (July 18, 1988)).
120. Steven L. Willborn, The Problem with Pension Portability, 77 NEB. L.
REV. 344, 345 (1998); see also PDBP, supra note 117, at 1042 (stating that "it
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As John Turner has noted, 121 portability in defined benefit
plans can be achieved in at least three ways. The first is to
preserve the real value of benefits or assets within a single
employer plan. 122 The failure to index for inflation the deferred
vested benefits of terminated employees may account for up to
two-thirds of all portability losses.12 3 The second is to pool pension
assets across employers in a multiemployer plan. This "would
permit employees to have complete portability between member
employers, akin to the voluntary plans in Europe." However, one
disadvantage to pooling is that firms have to overcome competing
with one another in order to coordinate the establishment of plans.
Unfortunately these barriers are so high that most multiemployer
plans are coordinated by a union
or are in a nonprofit setting ...Another disadvantage, related to the
first, is that the arrangements are voluntary. When one firm views
its liability as much less than average they will have incentive to
leave. 124

The third approach is to transfer pension assets or credited
service between plans:
In 1997, the most recent data currently available, only 8 % of full-

time employees with a defined benefit plan working in medium and
large private establishments were in a plan that had a portability
feature of the third type, involving a transfer across plans. This
percentage differs across types of workers, being 10 % for blue collar
and service employees, compared to 4% for professional, technical,
125
and related employees.

is difficult to make portability voluntary because employers establish pension
plans to attract employees and to keep them. Employers do not want to
motivate their employees to leave, and the better deal they make for
portability, the more they are motivating their employees to leave.").
121. John Turner, Remarks at the Exploratory Workshop: Cross-Border
Portability of Pension Rights: An Important Condition for an Integrated
Market for Pension Provision, (Feb. 28 - Mar. 1 2003) (remarking on John
Turner, PUBLIC POL'Y INSTITUTE, AARP, Pension Portability in the United
States (June 2002)).
122. See David Blake and J. Michael Orszag, Portabilityand Preservation of
Pension Rights in the U.K., REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S INQUIRY
INTO PENSIONS 6 (The Pensions Institute, London, U.K., July 1997) (reporting
that "[o]ur conclusion is that the outcome of U.K. legislation over the past two
decades has been a dramatic improvement in the position of early leavers").
123. Ulrich, supra note 118, at 209 (citing Dep't of Labor data).
124. Teresa Ghilarducci, De-linking Benefits from a Single Employer:
Alternative Multiemployer Models, PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL 1, 28 (2001).
125. Turner, supra note 123 (citing Bureau of Labor Standards survey data);
National Council on Teacher Retirement, Broadening Pension Portabilityfor
Public School Teachers Through Interstate Reciprocity - Survey of Current
Statutes and Model Legislation (Aug. 25, 2003), available at

http://www.nctr.orglresources/studies andsurveys.html.
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The value of the benefits accrued under a typical defined
benefit plan is very small for many years, whether expressed as a
deferred monthly pension or as a lump sum present value.
Consideration should be given to requiring earlier accruals: again,
this would involve additional expense for sponsoring employers,
but this may be more manageable and less controversial than
other possible changes discussed, particularly as it is consistent
with the reasons given by many large employers for converting to
cash balance plans.
As a matter of overall pension policy, employers should be
encouraged to provide at least part of the retirement benefit under
a defined benefit plan. One possible approach would be to use the
multiemployer plan model which has worked well for union
employees in many industries. Under this approach, employers
would make their contributions (and any employee contributions)
to a national or regional fund or clearinghouse. The employers'
only responsibility would be to make the stipulated contributions:
all other administrative and investment functions would be
performed by the fund. There would be portability of service
credits between the group of contributing employers, 126 but there
would be no portability outside the group. For this reason, the
ideal administrator would be Social Security, which already
manages portable pension benefits for over 95% of American
workers, at a very low administrative cost.
VII. DEFINED BENEFIT AND DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
Unlike a defined benefit plan or Social Security, which
provides a monthly income for life which, in the case of Social
Security benefits, is indexed for inflation, a retiree whose
retirement benefits are held in a defined contribution plan or IRA
has to determine how much he or she should withdraw each year.
Withdraw too much, and the fund will be exhausted before death;
withdraw too little and he or she may be depriving himself or
herself of enough income to maintain a comfortable lifestyle.
Unfortunately, most of the data needed to make this calculation
are unknown: how long the individual will live; the rate of return
on investments, each year for the rest of his or her life; future tax
rates; future inflation rates; out of pocket medical expenses; and
whether he or she will need long term care.
In a rational world which, unfortunately, bears little
resemblance to the one we live in, an excellent way to improve

126. See Ann C. Foster, Portability of Pension Benefits Among Jobs,
MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 1, 45 (July 1994) (noting that in 1987, nearly half of

all multiemployer funds included reciprocity agreements, and that the two
reciprocity systems most widely used in multiemployer defined benefit plans
are pro rata reciprocity and "money follows the man.").
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retirement security would be to increase benefits under the highly
efficient Social Security system:
With its proven track record, it holds the best prospect for using new
money effectively to improve retirement security. Wise policy would
first balance Social Security finances without cutting benefits. It
would then make benefits
more adequate before subsidizing other
1 27
retirement income tools.
Regina Jefferson has proposed an insurance program for
defined contribution plans that, unlike the defined benefit plan
insurance program under Title IV of ERISA, would be voluntary
and provided through private insurers. She argues that the failure
to provide insurance to defined contribution plans may have been
justified in 1974, when Congress couldn't foresee the shift to
defined contribution plans, but it is unacceptable today. 128
VIII. RISKS IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
Perhaps the most pernicious single effect of the switch from
defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans is the resulting
transfer of risk from the employer-which is generally more
sophisticated, has more resources, and can spread its risk over its
entire workforce and over a long period of time-to the individual
employee, who enjoys none of those advantages. "[T]he 401(k)
revolution has done far more good to Wall Street than to the
129
financial security of retired workers."
In a defined contribution regime, retirees face several major
risks: the risk of outliving their assets; inflation that erodes the
value of their assets; lower than expected earnings from
investments; and large unpredictable expenses, particularly for
130
medical expenses or long term care.
One little-understood risk is the risk of assuming that
investment earnings will be constant. 131 A recent CRS report to
127. Virginia P. Reno, Building on Social Security's Success, ECON. POLICY
INST., Briefing Paper #208, (Nov. 20, 2007).

128. Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans,
4 FLA. TAx REV. 607, 640-41 (2000).

129.

Jeff Madrick, The Specter Haunting Old Age, 55 N.Y. REVIEW OF

BOOKS, (Mar. 20, 2008) (reviewing Robin Blackburn, Age Shock: How Finance

Is Failing Us (2007); Alician H. Munnel & Steven A. Sass, Working Longer:
The Solution to the Retirement Income Challenge (2008); Greg Anrig, The
Conservatives Have No Clothes: Why Right- Wing Ideas Keep Failing (2007);
Jacob S. Hacker, The Great Risk Shift: The Assault on American Jobs,
Families, Health Care, and Retirement and How You Can Fight Back (2006);
and Teresa Ghilarducci, When I'm Sixty-four: The Plot Against Pensions and
the Plan to Save Them (2008)).
130. Pamela Perun, Putting Annuities Back Into Savings Plans, SOC'Y OF
ACTUARIES, SYMPOSIUM ON MANAGING RETIREMENT ASSETS 1, 6 (Apr. 1,
2004).
131. Structuring Income for Retirement, RESEARCH INSIGHTS REP. 1, 7
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Congress makes the point that there is a wide variance in future
retirement plan investment returns, and that there is a 5%
likelihood that the 5.5% annual return projected in the report
could be as little as 1.7%.132
IX. AVERAGE ACCOUNT BALANCES IN DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION PLANS
The first major flaw in the private retirement system is lack
of cove.=age: 133 the second is inadequate benefits. A 2001 report
found that nearly 30% of active plan participants had a total plan
balance less than $5,000.134 In 1998, the mean value of all IRA and
401(k) accounts was $35,000 and the median value was only
$14,000. For ages fifty-five to sixty-four, the average account
balance was about $57,000. A $57,000 account for a sixty-five year
old in May 2001 would have bought a single life annuity of only
135
$450 per month.
Workers shoulder much more of the risk of 401(k) plans than
their employers. 136 At the end of 2006, the average 401(k) account
balance was $121,202. However, the median account balance was
only $66,650. Even for the minority of long-tenured participants
(thirty years or more with the current employcr) in their sixties,

(Fidelity Research Inst., Boston, M.A., Aug. 2007).
132. See Patrick Purcell & Debra Whitman, Retirement Savings: How Much
Will Workers Have When They Retire? CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REP. 1, 37 (Jan.
29, 2007)( "A worker who is told that the most likely real rate of return on his
or her investments is 5.5% might save more or less than if he or she were told
that the most likely real rate of return will be between 1.7% and 9.3%. Both
statements are true, but the second more clearly conveys the uncertainty that
characterizes any estimate of likely future rates of return on investment.")..
133. See Pensions at a Glance/Public PoliciesAcross OECD Countries, 2007
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 77 (noting that only 47%
of Americans are covered, compared to 90% for Australia, 90% for Denmark,
57% for Germany, 58% for Hungary, 90% for Iceland, 90% for the Netherlands
and 90% for Norway).
134. Employee Benefits Security Administration, Report of the Working
Group on Planning for Retirement, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Nov. 14, 2001),
available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/ publications/AC-111401_report.html.
135. Id. See also Pension Plans: Characteristicsof Persons in the Labor Force
Without Pension Coverage, Report to Congressional Requesters GAO/HEHS00-131, 2007 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF. 1, 27 (reflecting on the CRS Analysis of the
1996 Panel of the Census Bureau's Survey of Income and Program
Participation). The mean and median values of all retirement accounts in a
household were, respectively, as follows:
Workers 25 to 34: $20,2598,000
Workers 35 to 44: $41,58220,000
Workers 45 to 54: $57,84528,000
Workers 55 to 64: $72,34736,668.
Id.
136. Savings for Life: A Pathway to Financial Security for All Americans,
2007 ASPEN INST. 25.
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the median account balance was less than $100,000 for those
earning $60,000 or less. 137 Only six of the thirty OECD countries
have lower "pension wealth" than the U.S.: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Turkey. 138
Even with Social Security, the accumulated pension benefits
are low:
Currently, the average American head of household between age 62
and 65 only has about $110,000, if you add the median 401(k)
account balance to the median rollover IRA balance- or less than
twice the median salary of $61,600 for that age group. If the typical
Social Security benefit for that income level is about $18,500 a year,
that person will only receive a total of about $27,200 a year in
retirement income when added to the $8,700 a year generated from
the $110,000 nest egg- or less than 45% of pre-retirement income.
And that's assuming that the retiree ONLY lives another 20
39
years.1
A large part of the problem is low employer contribution
rates. Most companies provide a 50% match on employee
contributions, often subject to a cap. Only 4% of companies match
100% of employees' contributions on up to 6% of pay, and only a
third of all companies make an automatic contribution. 40 By
contrast, seven of the OECD countries have 401(k) style plans that
include mandatory employer contribution rates averaging 7.5% of
4
pay, more than twice the U.S. average.' '
By U.S. standards, IBM is making unusually generous
contributions to its new 401(k) plan: all its employees will receive
an automatic contribution, from 1% to 4% of pay; some older
employees who were covered by the defined benefit plan will get
an additional 5% of pay each year; and IBM gives participants a

137. Jack VanDerhei et al., 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances,
and Loan Activity in 2006, 308 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF 24
(2007).
138. Jane White, Filling America's Empty Nest Eggs: The Crisis Nobody's
Talking About, EMP. BENEFIT NEWS (2008).
139. Id. See also Patrick Purcell et al., CRS Report for Congress: Retirement
Savings: How Much Will Workers Have When They Retire, 2007 CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 6. "An individual retiring at age 65 in January 2007
with $119,500, the median retirement account balance among married-couple
households head by persons age 55 and older could purchase a level, single-life
annuity that would pay $826 per month ($9,912 per year) or a joint and 100%
survivor annuity paying $662 per month ($7,944 per year), based on the
current annuity interest rate of 5.25%." Id.
140. Mark Bruno, IBM raises the bar with new 401(k) plan, PENSIONS AND
INV., Mar. 17, 2008, availableat http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll
/article?AID=/20080317/REG/950467789/1030/TOC.
141. Australia, 7.25% of pay; Denmark, 11.8%; Hungary, 8%; Mexico, 6.5%,
Norway, 2%; Poland, 7.3%;,Slovak Republic, 9%; Sweden, 4.5%. Pensions at a
Glance/Public Policies Across OECD Countries, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Paris, France: OECD 2007: 25-30.
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dollar-for-dollar match on contributions up to 6% of pay. Even so,
[tihe company expects to realize big long-term savings compared
with the cost of maintaining its traditional pension plans. IBM
estimates all the changes to its various plans will allow it to reduce
worldwide retirement expenses by a total of $2.5 billion to $3 billion
by 2010 -substantial savings, even for a company that generated
$10.4 billion in income last year off almost $100 billion in
4
revenue.1 2

According to a recent report, 143 declines in annual
performance-based bonuses and stock-option awards have cut the
rate of growth of CEO pay, but CEO pension benefits were up
more than 25%. In 2007, for companies with consecutive years of
data under the new SEC disclosure rules, (1) the median value of
accumulated pension benefits for S&P 500 chief executives was
$6,106,986, an increase of 29.5% over the median of $4,716,206 in
2006, and (2) the median value of deferred compensation plan
balances increased by 54.3% from 2006 to 2007, climbing to a
median value of $4,517,488. In light of these findings, it is hard to
argue with Jane White and Rick Meigs when they assert that
Companies that can afford to compensate executives with eyepopping paychecks and pensions should be able to cough up $17,600
or so toward the nest egg of a typical highly productive rank-and-file
employee, compared to the typical contribution of $5,866. We
arrived at that sum by assuming 9% of a $48,000 salary that
increases by 1.1% a year for four years, the average job tenure for
American workers, compared to the typical 3% contribution rate
144
offered by U.S. employers.
American employers may claim that Americans enjoy a
higher standard of living, which makes it possible to save on our
own. However, the median wage for U.S. workers is, in fact,
relatively low: of the 30 OECD countries, 16 have higher average
wages than the U.S.145
According to Jane White and Rick Meigs, assuming a typical
(3%) employer contribution, "even the tiny minority of participants
who are savvy enough to start contributing at age 25 must save
10% of their salary to build an adequate nest egg by age 65."
Waiting until age 35 increases the contribution rate to more than
17%; waiting until age 40 increases it to more than 23% of pay;
and waiting until age 50 requires 48% of pay.

142. Bruno, supra note 140.
143. Press Release, S&P 500 CEO Compensation Rises 1.3% to 8.8 Million,
EQUILAR, Apr. 10, 2008, availableat http:// www.equilar.com/
press_20080410.php.
144. Jane White and Rick Meigs, Employers owe employees 401(k)
contributions,EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, Apr. 1, 2008.

145. Pensions at a Glance, supra note 133.
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[Iun a 2006 study of its participants only 11% of Vanguard Group's
participants save the maximum allowed ($15,000 in 2006) and the
median contribution rate is 6% of pay. What's more, the average
contribution rate (medians weren't available) doesn't rise
significantly over people's life spans; it's only a little more than
twice for those over 60 as it is for folks in their twenties. The
average rate is only 4.25% for those under 25, 5.80% for those
between the ages of 25-34, 6.75% for those age 35-44, 7.77% for
those age 45-54, 9.14% for those age 55 to 64 and 10.81% for those
46
age 65 and older.'
These numbers suggest two conclusions. First, a 3%
contribution rate-the rate most often suggested by advocates of
mandatory employer contributions-is too low, even for young
employees. 147 Secondly,
the automatic
enrollment
design
encouraged by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 includes a
default rate that is too low for job-changers: most plans will
probably start them at 3% each time they switch jobs, regardless
of their age.
X. REPLACEMENT RATIOS
One goal for a retirement income policy is to help retirees to
continue to enjoy approximately the same standard of living that
they enjoyed before retirement. One way of measuring this goal is
to calculate the required replacement ratio, i.e. the percentage of
pre-retirement income that is needed in retirement. This involves
difficult threshold issues: first, individuals' needs and consumption
patterns in retirement are not uniform; second, many of the major
expenses incurred by retirees, notably out-of-pocket medical
expenses and long-term care expenses, are unpredictable. In
addition, to focus exclusively on replacement ratios would be to
ignore a basic fact: a retiree's assets and investment strategy must
provide enough cash to pay the bills. "One way to help ameliorate
[market] risk is to get a handle on a client's estimated spending
over the first five to ten years of retirement and set part of her
portfolio aside to make sure her income needs can be met
1 48
whatever happens in the market."

146. How America Saves, A Report on Vanguard 2006 Defined Contribution
Plan Data,VANGUARD GROUP 1, 15, (2007), availableat https://institutional.
vanguard.com/iip/pdf/ CRRHAS_2007.pdf.
147. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, Coming of Age: Toward
a National Retirement Income Policy, GOVT PRINTING OFFICE 1, 131 (Feb. 26,
1981). The 3% rate was recommended in the 1981 Minimum Universal
Pension System (MUPS) proposal, and is also generally the minimum required
contribution to a top-heavy defined contribution plan [Code section 416] and
under certain 40 1(k) safe harbor designs. Id.
148. W. Van Harlow & Moshe A. Milevsky, Structuring Income for
Retirement
(2007),
available
at
http://financial
page.blogspot.com2007/08/structuring-income-for-retirement.html
(full
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Currently, the Social Security Administration estimates that
for a career-long average-wage earner retiring at the full
retirement age, Social Security will replace about 41% of their
career-average earnings. For a career-long low-wage earner, Social
Security will replace an estimated 55% of average earnings. For a
career-long high-wage earner, Social Security will replace just 27%
of their average earnings. 149 These replacement ratios will almost
certainly decline over the next twenty to thirty years.
The replacement rate for a medium earner retiring at age 65 is now
about 39% after deducting the premiums for Medicare Part B, which
pay for doctors' bills and are deducted directly from Social Security
checks. By 2030, the net replacement rate for a similar 65-year-old
retiree will drop to about 32%. Reasons for this decline include the
legislated increase in the "full-benefit age" for receiving Social
Security benefits and rising Medicare premiums that are deducted
directly from Social Security benefits. 150
The growing cost and tax burdens associated with Medicare
alone suggest that even the most conservative target replacement
1 51
rates may be inadequate.
Traditional retirement income replacement rate models
typically conclude that a retiree needs retirement income of 70% to
80% of pre-retirement income in order to maintain his or her preretirement standard of living. A recent study argues that "One of
the biggest weaknesses of replacement rate models is that one or
more of the most important retirement risks is ignored:
investment risk, longevity risk, and risk of potentially catastrophic
health care costs" and suggests that far higher replacement rates
may be necessary if the retiree is to have a 50% or better
probability or retirement income adequacy. A one size fits all
model is inadequate for workers, who are different ages, have
different levels of income, and different health care needs. 152
How much additional income will 401(k) plans provide?
An individual retiring at age 65 in January 2007 with $119,500, the
median retirement account balance among married-couple
households headed by persons age 55 and older, could purchase a
level, single-life annuity that would pay $826 per month ($9,912 per
year) or a joint and 100% survivor annuity paying $662 per month

document on file with author).
149. Purcell & Whitman, supra note 132, at 20.
150. Virginia P. Reno, Building on Social Security's Success, ECON. POLICY
INST. 1, 13 (2007).

151. Alicia H. Munnell, Medicare Costs and Retirement Security 1, (Ctr. for
Ret. Research at Boston College 2007).
152. Jack VanDerhei, et al, Measuring Retirement Income Adequacy:
CalculatingRealistic Income Replacement Rates, 297 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH
INST. ISSUE BRIEF 5 (2006); see also Peter J. Brady, Measuring Retirement
Resource Adequacy, INV. CO. INST. (2008).
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($7,944 per year), based on the current annuity interest rate of
5.25%. These amounts would replace just 19% and 15%,
respectively, of the median household earnings of $52,000 among all
married-couple households headed by individuals who were 60 to 64
years old in 2004.153
Most studies suggest that the situation will get worse.
The National Retirement Risk Index (NRRI) has shown that even if
households work to age 65 and annuitize all their financial assets,
including the receipts from reverse mortgages on their homes,
nearly 45 % will be 'at risk' of being unable to maintain their
154
standard of living in retirement.
XI. THE IMPACT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES
Out of pocket medical expenses have a major effect on the
financial security of the elderly, and on their retirement decisions:
Median out-of-pocket health care spending as a share of income
totaled 14 percent for adults age 65 to 74 in 2003 and 22 percent for
those age 85 and older... A typical older married couple could
devote about 35 percent of its after-tax income to health care in
2030.155
Over the immediate future, the average annual growth in
health expenditures is expected to be 6.7%, 156 far higher than
general inflation or the rate of increase in Social Security benefits.
Advisors should help their clients identify and manage risk in
157
health care.
The general revenue contribution to Part B of Medicare is 1.3
% of GDP; by 2040 that will rise to 3.4 % of GDP. "Assuming all
else stays unchanged, rising SMI costs would require Americans,
including retirees, to face an 18.5 % increase in income tax rates in
2040."158
In 2005, only 33% of employers with more than 200
employees offered retiree health benefits, down from 68% in
1988.159 In 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services

153. Purcell & Whitman, supra note 132.
154. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Is There Really a Retirement Savings Crisis?
An NRRI Analysis, 2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College 2007).
155. Richard W. Johnson et al., Do Out-of-Pocket Health Care Costs Delay
Retirement 2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College 2008).
156. Sean Keehan et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2017: The
Baby-Boom Generation Is Coming to Medicare, 27, Health Affairs web
exclusive, (2008).
157. See www.IncomeAtRisk.com (developing new retirement structures that
focus on the risks involved with the rising costs of healthcare).
158. Munnell, supra note 154, at 2.
159. Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2005 Annual
Survey: Retiree Health Benefits 1, 114
(2005),
available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/sections/ upload7315Sectionl 1.pdf.
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(CMS) estimated that Medicare out-of-pocket expenses were
approximately $3,800 for one person, $7,600 for a couple. Items
not covered by Medicare (dental, hearing aids, glasses) may add
160
$500 per person.
Another recent report found a wide range of possible costs for
a worker aged 35 in 2006 who is assumed to retire at age 60:
[W]e see a wide range of potential results: these start at a low of
$76,000 for a typical FAS 106 trend (if the employer pays 100 % of
cost- probably unlikely in 2031) to a high of $2.26 million with a 10
% trend and the retiree paying full cost. Note that the values vary
importantly with changes in trend, discount rate, mortality, and
other assumptions. While these hypothetical examples illustrate
potential outcomes, results for individuals can vary significantly. 161

For those lucky enough still to have employer-provided retiree
health benefits the trend, as with plans for active employees, has
been to increase the retiree's share of the total cost:
The Mercer 2004 Survey showed that 38% of employers offering
retiree health care plans required enrollees to pay the entire
premium as well as out-of-pocket benefit costs: such plans offer
coverage, but not necessarily affordable coverage. Only 13 % of
employers provided coverage at no cost to retirees. For the 49 % that
shared the cost with retirees, the average retiree portion was 34 %
of the plan cost. The results for Medicare-eligible plan coverage were
similar: 37 % require the retirees to bear the full cost; 15 % provide
coverage at no cost to retirees; and 47% share the cost, requiring
2
retirees to pay 35 % of it.16

160. 2007 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the Federal Hospital
Insurance and Federal Supplemental Medical Insurance Trust Funds, BOARD
OF TRUSTEES, FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTAL
MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/rep

ortstrust funds/downloads/tr2007.pdf.
161. George Wagoner, et al., Risk-Sharing in Retiree Medical Benefits 2005
PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL 15; see also Richard W. Johnson et al, Will
Health Care Costs Erode Retirement Security 1, 3 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at
Boston College 2004) (projecting that health care spending for older married
couples will increase from 16% of net after-tax income in 2000, to 35% in 2030;
that unmarried older adults will face an increase from 17% to 30%; and that
the problems will be most severe for lower income people, and for unhealthy
individuals). According to EBRI, out of pocket medical expenses will cost
$295,000 for a 65 year old couple retiring without employer provided health
benefits and living to an average life expectancy, without including long term
care. FinancialAdvisers Help Investors Plan for Retirement Amid Increased
Health Care Costs (2006), available at http://www.Kaisernetwor.org/dailyreports/repindex.cfm?hint=3&DRID=41501. According to another analyst, a
retired couple without retiree health benefits needs $225,000, up from
$215,000 in 2007, and 160,000 in 2002. Eileen Alt Powell, Retired Couple
Needs $225Kfor Medical, NEWSVINE, Mar. 5, 2008.
162. Wagoner, supra note 161, at 11.

1128

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:1091

The lack of adequate health insurance, particularly for those
not yet eligible for Medicare, is a growing problem. "Surveys have
found that retiree health insurance plays a bigger role in the
timing of retirement than pensions do".163 For those who are not
yet retired, the answer is straightforward, if unpalatable:
The dual problems of accessibility and affordability of coverage
mean that employees will have to save more money for retiree
health care expenses, allocate more financial resources to health
care, work longer, rely on help from family, or use a combination of
164 '
these approaches.
And, as Alicia Munnell points out:
The National Retirement Risk Index has shown that even if
households work to age 65 and annuitize all their financial assets,
including the receipts from reverse mortgages on their homes, 44 %
will be 'at risk' of being unable to maintain their standard of living
in retirement. 165
This analysis did
health care is included,
to 61%. If people do not
costs in retirement, the

not address rising health care costs. If
the percentage of households 'at risk' rises
plan, and accumulate funds for health care
6
percentage at risk increases to 67%.16

XII. LONG-TERM CARE
As Richard Kaplan has noted, the need for, and cost of, longterm care is the single most unpredictable financial hazard of old
age: "the funding of long-term care is the single greatest gap in
retirement planning, even though this potential black hole could
totally eclipse all of the carefully constructed parameters of pre' 167
retirement calculations."
The coverage of long-term care (at home or in a nursing home)
under Medicare or Medicare supplemental (Medigap) insurance is
very limited, generally covering only care in a skilled nursing
facility for the period immediately following in-patient hospital
treatment.168 Most long term care is custodial, rather than
medical, so does not satisfy the basic requirement for Medicare
coverage.

163. See John O'Neil, Want to Retire Early and Hang a Shingle? It'll Cost
You, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2006 availableat http://www.nytimes.com

/2006/04/11business/retirement/ 1lgap.html (quoting Cara Jareb, director of
retiree health consulting at Watson Wyatt).
164. Wagoner, supra note 161, at 13.
165. Alicia H. Munnell, et al, Health Care Costs Drive Up the National

Retirement Risk Index 1 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College 2008).
166. Id.
167. Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning'sGreatest Gap: Funding Longterm Care, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407, 409 (2007).
168. Id. at 419-20.
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In the absence of Medicare, there are three possible sources of
payment: personal assets, long term care insurance or Medicaid. 169
Coverage under Medicaid generally requires almost total depletion
170
of the individual's assets.
Long-term care expenses exemplify the type of expenses that
should be covered by insurance: they are more likely to be incurred
than most other insured risks (e.g., a house fire), their incidence is
unpredictable, and the financial consequences are potentially
devastating. Accordingly, my view is that the risk and the costs
should be spread as widely as possible through a universal federal
program, financed from general revenues or from a dedicated tax.
The federal and state governments are already paying the bulk of
the cost, through Medicaid, under a system that is patently unfair
and arbitrary.
The best estimates suggest that less than 10% of older
Americans have long-term care insurance. The federal government
has sought to increase this number by providing tax incentives,
principally the deductibility of long-term care insurance
premiums; and by approving state-level "partnerships" that allow
a Medicaid applicant to retain a certain level of assets if he or she
is covered by a qualifying partnership insurance policy. 171 These
efforts have been largely unsuccessful: the tax benefit is often of
little value (particularly because it is an itemized deduction and
limited in amount), and not enough individuals are convinced that
it is in their best interests to buy a policy.
It is also difficult to get an accurate estimate of how likely it
is that an individual will need long term care. According to one
study, almost 70% of Americans who turned 65 years old in 2005
will eventually require some long-term care, 172 but other estimates
are far lower. The risk is significantly higher for women than for
men, because women as a group live longer. Most long-term care
is still provided at home, by unpaid family members. Some people
require care for very short periods: others spend 15 years or more
in a nursing home.
According to a 2005 survey conducted for the Society of
Actuaries, 52% of retirees are very or somewhat concerned about
having enough money to pay for extended care at home or in a
nursing home. 61% of pre-retirees are concerned about having
enough money to pay for long-term care. Both retirees and preretirees are more likely to try to save for long-term care costs
rather than insure themselves against this risk. They are either

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 410-12.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 437-38.

Id.
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currently saving (34% of retirees, 16% of pre-retirees) or intend to
save (15%, 34%) against the possibility of needing long-term care
or having large health expenses. Only about one-third of retirees
indicate they already have (20%) or intend to purchase (14%) longterm care insurance and four in ten pre-retirees say they already
have (16 %) or intend to purchase (27%) this insurance. 16% of
retirees and pre-retirees have made or intend to make
arrangements for care through a continuing care retirement
173
community.
Apart from the expense of good coverage, it seems clear that
many potential purchasers are deterred by the bewildering variety
of features offered by different policies: few insurance contracts
are simple, but long-term care products are more complex than
most. Shopping for Medigap policies has been greatly simplified by
the mandatory standardization of policy features, and this should
also be mandated for long-term care insurance. "[S]tandardizing
the variety of LTC insurance policies now being sold would make it
easier for consumers to compare premiums, might lead to more
competition among insurers, and could make policies generally
' 174
more understandable."
Finally, studies have shown that implementing a long-term
care program with group features "can result in employer costs
very similar to a dental plan."175 Some (generally larger)
organizations, including the California Public Employees'
Retirement System, offer long term care insurance. The Federal
Employee Health Benefits Program offers insurance at rates 1020% below typical individual rates, due to reduced marketing
expenses and economies of scale. If the employer pays the
premiums for long-term care insurance for an employee-or the
employee's spouse or dependents-then the premium-like health
insurance premiums-is excluded from the employee's taxable
income.176 However, there is no exclusion if the benefits are
177
provided through a flexible spending or similar arrangement.
Many more employers would be likely to offer this option, if they
could do so through a flex plan, so this rule should be changed.

173.

Am. Soc'y of Actuaries, 2005 Risks And Process Of Retirement Survey 12

(2005).
174. Congressional Budget Office, FinancingLong-Term Care for the Elderly
27 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ ftpdocs/54xx/doc5400/04-26LongTermCare.pdf.
175. Jon Shreve, I'm not going to pay a lot for this long-term care plan,
MILLIMAN, Dec. 1, 2007, availableat http://www.milliman.com/expertise/healt
hcare/publications/true-group-ltc/im-not-going-to-pay-LTC12-01-07.php.
176. I.R.C. § 106(a).
177. I.R.C. § 106(c).
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XIII. LIFE EXPECTANCY
Life expectancy continues to increase. The average life
expectancy of Americans born in 1960 was 69.7 years. It has been
estimated that those who were born in 2005 will live for an
178
average of 77.8 years.
However, the growth is not uniform: "New government
research has found "large and growing" disparities in life
expectancy for richer and poorer Americans, paralleling the
growth of income inequality in the last two decades." Federal
officials found "widening socioeconomic inequalities in life
expectancy" at birth and at every age level. 179
XIV. WORKING LONGER
The statistical evidence is clear: in recent years, there has
been a significant increase in the number of older Americans in
the workforce, 80o for a variety of reasons: better health, increased
life expectancy, concerns about the adequacy of retirement income,
concerns about health insurance and medical expenses, and an
increased recognition by some employers of the need to retain the

178. Patrick Purcell et al, CRS Report for Congress: Pension Sponsorship
and Participation: Summary of Recent Trends, 2006 CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE 1. See also Olga Sorokina, et al., Pension Wealth And Income: 1992,
1998, and 2004 1, 6 n.12 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston College 2007)
("According to the Social Security Cohort Mortality Tables, life expectancy of
an average 65-year-old man increased from 15.8 years in 1992 to 16.7 years in
2004. During the same time period, life expectancy of an average 65-year-old
woman increased from 19.2 to 19.8 years.").
179. Robert Pear, Gap in Life Expectancy Widens for the Nation, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2008, at Al.
180. Patrick Purcell, CRS Report for Congress: Older workers: Employment
and Retirement Trends, Summary (Congressional Research Service 2006). The
report states:
Recent Census Bureau data show that the percentage of men and
women age 62 and older who work in paid employment has risen over
the past 10 years. In March 2006, 52% of men aged 62 to 64 were
employed, compared with 43% in 1995 and 42% in 1990. Of men aged 65
to 69, 31% were employed in March 2006, compared with 27% in 1995
and 26% in 1990. Among women 62 to 64 years old, 41% were working
in March 2006, compared with 32% in 1995 and 28% in 1990, whereas
among women 65 to 69 years old, 23% were working in March 2006,
compared with 17% in 1995 and 1990. There also has been a trend
toward more full-time employment among older Americans who work.
Id.; see C. Schooler, L. Caplan, & G. Oates, Aging and Work: An Overview in
Impact of Work on Older Adults, SPRINGER PUBLISHING, INC. (1997)
(discussing the effects of aging on the ability to continue working); see also
Murray Gendell, Older workers: increasingtheir labor force participationand
hours of work, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Jan. 2008; Senate Special Committee
on Aging, Report of the Taskforce on the Aging of the American Workforce,
(2008).
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expertise and work ethic of older employees.1 8'
A recent study by the Urban Institute discusses four current
strategies to employ and retain older workers: flexible work
arrangements; phased retirement plans; job search assistance
182
resources; and programs to train older workers
Some observers welcome this trend: others deplore it, as they
think that those who do continue to work are generally compelled
83
to do so by the inadequacies of the social safety net.'
[R]aising the Medicare eligibility age, perhaps to age 67 to make it
consistent with the eligibility age for full Social Security retirement
benefits for people born in 1960 and later, could lead many workers
to delay retirement. But enhanced protections for people with
serious health problems should accompany any new restrictions on
Medicare eligibility, because many people facing the steepest health
care costs in later life are physically unable to extend their work
84
lives.'
Another recent study came to a more optimistic conclusion
about the ability of older Americans to keep working: The decline
in physically demanding occupations will likely improve
employment prospects for older adults, but the growth in cognitive
demands may limit options for some older people, especially those
18 5
with limited education.
In addition to improving the economic outlook, working longer
can enhance individual well-being. Two recent changes to the
Social Security benefits entitlement rules-the gradual increase in

181. See, e.g., Marsha King, Companies find ways to retain expertise of older
workers, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at Al.
182. Lauren Eyster et al., Current Strategies to Employ and Retain Older
Workers, URBAN INST. 1 (2008).
183. "The proposed 'so-called' winning solution to strained pension budgets
of people working until age 70 may not be possible as jobs held by the elderly
become more difficult. In addition, though some elderly may find work
attractive; as retirement income fails older people lose the ability to seek the
work on their terms, and those of the employer prevail." Teresa Ghilarducci,
The Changing Role of Employer Pensions: Tax Expenditures, Costs, and
Implications for Middle-Class Elderly, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLLEGE 1,
2 (2006). As the famous English actor, Peter Cook, observed, "All in all I'd
rather have been a judge than a miner. And what is more, being a miner, as
soon as you are too old and tired and sick and stupid to do the job properly,
you have to go. Well, the very opposite applies with the judges."
184. Johnson, supra note 165, at 33. "If every worker delayed retirement by
five years, relative to retirement plans based on current work patterns, the
additional income and payroll taxes they would pay would more than cover the
Social Security trust fund deficit for the foreseeable future." Government
Spending on the Elderly, 2007 DIMITRI B. PAPADIMITRIOU ED., PALGRAVE
MACMILLAN 1, 141.
185. Abstract of Richard W. Johnson, et al., Employment at Older Ages and
the ChangingNature of Work (Nov. 1, 2007) availableat http://www.urban.org
/publications/ 1001154.html.
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the full retirement age (FRA) from sixty-five to sixty-seven and the
abolition of the earnings test for people over FRA but under age
seventy-should also encourage people to work longer.
By
working until age sixty-seven instead of retiring at age sixty-two,
for example, a typical worker could gain about $10,000 in annual
income at age seventy-five, net of federal income taxes and health
186
insurance premiums.
Recent research suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach
would be ineffective and inequitable:
We find that career paths are changing significantly- and in
different ways for different parts of the population- over time. For
women, work history is increasing rapidly, with more educated
women demonstrating the strongest average work histories. For
men, work histories are more similar by education; still, men with
less than a high school education on average work less- not more187
than other men by middle and pre-retirement age.
And, as Teresa Ghilarducci points out:
A fundamental question for policy makers and for our scrutiny of
federal spending on the elderly is whether federal policy is creating
more older workers because they want jobs or because they have lost
pensions. Clearly, some workers will want to work longer, at least
part time. It is not clear, showever, that employers will provide the
jobs older workers want.18
Finally, John Shoven suggests that, instead of focusing on
attained age, we should look instead at remaining life
expectancy.189

186. Butrica, et al., Does Work Pay at Older Ages, URBAN INST. (2004).
Individuals can increase Social Security lifetime benefits by delaying the
claim, even if they do not work. Because of increasing life expectancy, the
increases exceed the actuarially fair amount, thus over-compensating those
who delay. Courtney Coile, et al., Delays in Claiming Social Security
Benefits,11-19, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 199; see also Steven A.

Sass et al, When Should Married Men Claim Social Security Benefits? 1, (Ctr.
for Ret. Research at Boston College 2008) (exclaiming that "[i]f married men
delayed claiming Social Security benefits, retirement income security would
significantly improve.").
187. Melissa M. Favreault & C. Eugene Steuerle, The Implications of Career
Lengths for Social Security, URBAN INST. vi-vii (2003).
188. Ghilarducci, supra note 183, at 26-27.
189. John B. Shoven, New Age Thinking: Alternative Ways of MeasuringAge,
Their Relationship to Labor ForceParticipation,Government Policies and GDP
Abstract, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (2007).
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XV. HOW DO CURRENT RETIREES FARE?
"For 39% of elderly recipients, Social Security contributes
more than 90% of their income, and for one-quarter of recipients, it
is their only source of income." 190 According to EBRI, individuals
with the highest amounts of pension or annuity income tend to
fare better, but future retirees will be less likely to receive pension
or annuity income (other than Social Security).191 In 1980, there
were 30.1 million active participants in private sector defined
192
benefit plans: by 2003, this had declined to 21.3 million.
A 2007 EBRI study found that most 65 to 75 year olds fared
well between 1992 to 2004, but that those who were losing money
were losing it fast. Among those who participated in the study,
50% saw an average wealth decline of 5% from 1992-2004.193
194
However, those declines in wealth were not correlated with age.
By contrast another recent study found that the elderly
experienced an increase in wealth from the years 1998-2004. 195
This is explained by a desire to accumulate funds to pay for rising
196
medical costs and to bequeath assets to children.
The official poverty rate declined from over 33% of elderly
people in 1960 to less than 10% today. 197 Poverty rates are higher
among elderly women (12%), elderly African Americans (25%) and
elderly Hispanics (20%).198
However, many scholars believe that the official poverty
statistics significantly underestimate the numbers, because "the
poverty thresholds fail to capture the growth since 1963 in
housing, health, and other costs relative to food costs. For
example, people today spend closer to one-sixth of their income on
food rather than one-third."' 199
The authors conclude that proposed Medicare reforms for
increases in cost sharing should exclude poor elderly people. 200

190. Patrick Purcell, CRS Report for Congress: Income and Povety Among
Older Americans in 2006, Summary Cong. Research Service (2006).
191. Craig Copeland, How Are New Retirees Doing Financially in
Retirement, 302 EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF 1 (2007).

192. Purcell, supra note 190, at t.1.
193. Copeland, supra note 191, at 15.
194. Id.
195. David A. Love, et al., Finance and Economics Discusstion Series: The
Trajectory of Wealth in Retirement, FED. RESERVE BD. (2008).
196. Id.
197. Purcell, supra note 190.
198. Id. at 9.
199. See Barbara A. Butrica et al., How Many Struggle to Get By in
Retirement?, URBAN INST. 1, 3 (2008) (citing John Iceland, Measuring Poverty:
Theoretical and Empirical Considerations, vol.3, iss.4 MEASUREMENT:
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH & PERSPECTIVE 199 (2005)).
200. Barbara A. Butrica, et al., How Many Struggle To Get By In Retirement,
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Even using the official numbers, many older Americans are among
the near-poor:
In 2006, while just 9.4% of people aged 65 and older had incomes
below the poverty thresholds of $9,669 for an individual and $12,186
for a couple, 22% of older Americans had family incomes below 150%
of the thresholds ($14,504 for an individual and $18,279 for a
couple). Thirty-six percent of people 65 and older had incomes less
than twice the poverty1 thresholds ($19,338 for an individual and
20
$24,372 for a couple).
In addition, it seems clear that things are likely to get much
worse. According to the EBRI-ERF Retirement Security Projection
Model, in 2030, many American retirees would not be able to
afford nursing homes or home health providers. The projected
aggregate retirement income deficit in 2030 is at least $400 billion.
202

XVI. Is RETIREMENT SECURITY POSSIBLE?
A thought-provoking article by Jeffrey Gordon asks whether
retirement security is actually possible, and says:
A robustly competitive economy is likely to increase social wealth
overall and thereby to increase the capacity to fund social promises
(or guarantees) of retirement payouts, but it is also likely to increase
the risks borne by firms and individuals. Another complication is
that a government guarantee entails not only funding concerns but
may create moral-hazard effects at the firm or individual level. The
prudent retiree rule reminds us that absolutes in this area are not
possible, but also that we should take a sophisticated view of the
20 3
factors relevant to fashioning a reasonable balance.
He also points out that it is overly simplistic to assume that
defined contribution plans are always inherently more risky for
204
employees than defined benefit plans.
Several major life insurers have recently rolled out variable
annuities that de-emphasize costly life insurance features in favor
of guaranteed long-term withdrawal benefits- a feature once
limited to income annuities. Mutual funds emulate the systematic
withdrawal features of variable annuities without offering
URBAN INST. (2008), available at www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411627_
howmanystruggle.pdf.
201. Patrick Purcell, Income and Poverty Among Older Americans in 2006,

Cong. Research Service, Order Code RL32697, updated Sept. 24, 2007.
202. EBRI, Can America Afford Tomorrow's Retirees: Results From the
EBRI-ERF Retirement Security Projection Model, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 263

(Nov. 2003).
203. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The "Prudent Retiree Rule" What To Do When
Retirement Security Is Impossible?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2007).

204. Id.
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guarantees and their costs.
International banks sell high-networth investors structured notes that offer guarantees while
providing returns linked to market indices. Numerous defunct
firms promised or guarantees that they could not fulfill, e.g.
Mutual Benefit Life. "To fund its guarantees, the insurer made
riskier and riskier bets on real estate. Then the property market
'205
imploded and Mutual Benefit went bust.
XVII. RETIREMENT INVESTING
To maximize benefits under a defined contribution regime,
successful investment performance is very important, both in the
saving (accumulation) phase and in the spending (decumulation)
phase. Unfortunately, most individuals are not skilled investors,
and it is unrealistic to expect them to absorb the oftencontradictory advice peddled by the pundits of the day, or to be
able to evaluate risk and reward in today's uncertain investment
climate. One leading scholar, Zvi Bodie, suggests the following
guiding principles:
First, to enable participants in employer-sponsored 401k-type plans
to hedge minimum levels of retirement income, employers should
offer inflation-protected annuities in the plan. Second, advisors
should explicitly take account of the individual's willingness to
postpone retirement in suggesting an optimal asset allocation. The
greater the willingness to continue working past the expected
retirement date, the greater the proportion to invest in stocks.
Third, sponsors of self-directed investment plans can enhance the
risk-reward opportunities available to investors by offering optionlike securities or contracts as an additional asset class. These assets
can provide a means of leveraging participation in stock market
20 6
gains while protecting one's minimum standard of living.
For the ten year and fifty year periods ending December 31,
2006, the investment class that produced the highest average
annual returns was small stocks (13.5% and 14.5% respectively,
compared to 8.45 and 10.6% for the S & P 500 and 7.7% and 7.1%
for long-term corporate bonds); returns, however, on stocks are
more volatile: during that same period, the worst 5, 10 and 20 year
average returns for stocks were -2.4%, 1.2% and 6.5%. 207 How long
will your retirement savings last? Again, this depends largely on
205. William Glasgall, The New Retirement Wave, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, Oct.
2007; see also Phyllis C. Borzi, Martha P. Patterson, Regulating Markets for
Retirement Payouts: Solvency, Supervision and Credibility, (Working Paper
No. 2007-21).

206. Zvi Bodie, Retirement Investing: A New Approach (Boston University
School of Management Working Paper No. 2001-03, Feb. 2001).
207. Iris Mack Dayoub, Asset Allocation and Retirement: Do You Need to
Make a Change, AAII JOURNAL (2008), available at www.aaii.com (citing

Ibbotson Associates, Inc., Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation- 2006 Yearbook).
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how much you withdraw each year, and the rate of return you
achieve each year.
The following table shows the number of years retirement
savings will last, assuming that the annual payout increases by
4% a year and (unrealistically) that you can achieve the same rate
of return each year.
First Year
Payout %
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

4%
50
33.3
25
20
16.7
14.3
12.5
11.1
10

Investment
6%
5%
67.6
52
39.9
28.4
33.5
24.9
22.1
19.8
18.1
16.5
15.3
14.1
13.2
11.7
12.4
10.5
11

Return
8%
7%

42.4
28.9
22.1
18
15.2
13.1
11.6

69
35.8
25.4
20
16.5
14
12.3

9%

10%

53.1
30.8
22.7
18.1
15.2
13.1

42.8
26.9
20.4
16.6
14.1

208

Many advisors advocate the use of target-date funds.
different
markedly
funds
have
individual
However,
characteristics, and they are new enough that they have only
limited track records. Vanguard cites the following "key
considerations": the asset allocation glide path; passive versus
active management; packaged or customized solution; and the
20 9
impact on participant portfolios.
For its new 401(k) plan, IBM has developed in-house life-cycle
funds, which it customizes for participants. 210 A recent CRS
report stresses the unpredictability of future investment returns
for an individual participant, even given a rigorous analysis. 211
While the predicted annual average return was 5.5%, there was a
5% chance that the return would be 9.3% and a 5% chance that it
would be only 1.7%. Unfortunately, the 401(k) world is not Lake
Wobegon, so not all investors will be above average, and for an
investor in the unlucky 5% it is probably little comfort to be told
212
that all of his or her peers did better.

208. Id.

209. Vanguard Investment Consulting and Research, Evaluating and
Implementing Target-date Portfolios: Four Key Considerations(Mar. 4, 2008),
availableat https:/ linstitutional.vanguard.com/iip /pdf/ICR4KC.pdf.
210. Bruno, supra note 140.

211. Purcell & Whitman, supra note 149.
212. Peter Cook bemoaned, "I've always been after the trappings of great
luxury. But all I've got hold of are the trappings of great poverty. I've got hold
of the wrong load of trappings, and a rotten load they are too, ones I could
have very well done without." Alan Bennett, et al., Beyond the Fringe: A
Revue 47 (Samual French Inc. 1964).
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Some commentators criticize the emphasis on equities in

target-date funds. 2 13 The returns on equities are so volatile that
they create an uneven distribution of wealth with extreme winners
and extreme losers. According to Russell Investments' Russell
10/30/60 Retirement Rule, investment earnings during retirement
could be made up from 10% savings during the working years, 30%
pre-retirement investment growth, and 60% from growth after
retirement. 214 The theory all depends on having the right asset
mix of bonds and equities. The Russell Retirement Essentials
Portfolio (RREP), recently launched in Canada, has a 35%
215
allocation to equities and a 65% allocation to bonds.
A related issue, which has received attention recently from
DOL and Congress, is the level of fees charged to plan
participants. There is substantial evidence that neither plan
sponsors not participants understand this issue well enough.
According to a recent study by Chatham Partners, 77% of surveyed
sponsors indicated that current fee disclosure levels are sufficient,
but only 58% feel confident about their understanding of their
plan's overall costs. Sponsors are also dissatisfied with fees being
easy to compare to other providers (34%), revenue sharing
disclosure (38%), and fee transparency (42%).216
The current fund distribution system used by most plans is
also unduly expensive for participants: "The legacy distribution
system can cost an individual 40% of the retirement accumulation,
as compared to low-cost individual distribution or low-cost retail
distribution."2 17
XVIII. ANNUITIES IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS
These uncertainties have led a growing number of (mainly
larger) employers to consider offering annuities to their 401(k)
plan participants. IBM's new 401(k) plan offers a rollover annuity
option: at retirement, participants can roll over all or part of their
savings to an annuity, and they get institutional pricing rather
than retail pricing.218

213. Seth Ruthen, Creating the Next Generation Glidepaths for Defined
Contribution Plans, PIMCO, available at http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/View
points/2007/Glidepath+Paper-82007.htm.
214. Equity Allocation in Retirement Key to Making Savings Last, PLAN
SPONSOR MAGAZINE (April 3, 2008), availableat http://www.plansponsor.coml

pi-typelO/?RECORDI =40 952
215. Id.
216. News Release, Andrew McCollum, Looking Beneath The Surface,
CHATHAM PARTNERS (March 14, 2008), available at: http://www.chathampart

ners.net/Looking%20Beneath%20the%20Surface%2OPress%2ORelease.pdf.
217. Scott Burns, Broker System Costs You Years of Retirement Savings,

DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9, 2008, at Al.
218. Bruno, supra note 140.
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According to Hewitt Associates, 14% of plan sponsors now
offer annuities as a rollover option outside of their plans, while
another 5% offer an annuity or insurance product within the plan
that will help retired participants withdraw funds while
preserving their capital. Another 5% of plan sponsors polled by
Hewitt said they plan to add one of these options in 2008.219
For a participant, buying an annuity through a 401(k) plan
may be as much as 50% cheaper than buying one individually.
However, there are potential problems, including increased
premiums based on adverse selection; lack of portability; high
surrender charges; and lack of a survivor benefit in the event of a
220
premature death.
XIX. LACK OF INTEREST IN ANNUITIES
A 2003 Hewitt Associates survey found that 69% of workers
and 86% of retirees rated guaranteed lifetime income as "very
important." Why do so few participants receive annuity
distributions from individual account arrangements? There are, it
seems, two main causes: lack of interest in annuities on the part of
participants and concern among plan sponsors about the legal
risks associated with offering annuity options.
As long as the demand for an annuity distribution payout is low,
plan sponsors are not going to expend the time and resources
necessary to follow the [safe harbor] process. This area is not going
to command much plan-sponsor attention until the marketplace
comes up with solutions that participants desire. It's a demand221
based issue.
Annuities are not attractive investments, partly because, as
Pamela Perun has noted, it is not clear whether they are fairly
priced, and the market currently lacks an annuity product that
222
protects against inflation.
For many, if not most, plan participants, the main source of
information about retirement planning is their employer.
Employers, however, typically do not include a discussion of
guaranteed lifetime income options. Also, one wonders whether
general dissatisfaction with insurers' performance and behavior
with respect to health benefits will make people more reluctant to
219. Id.
220. Matthew Mogul, Annuities: The Next Big 401(k) Craze, KIPLINGER
RESOURCE CTR., Aug. 24, 2007, availableat http://www.kiplinger.comlbusiness

resource/forecast/archive/annuity-craze 070824.html.
221. Mark Schoeff Jr, A Tepid Reception for Annuities as 401(k) Payouts,
WORKFORCE MANAGMENT (citing David Wray, president of the Profit
Sharing/401(k) Council of America), available at http://www.workforce.com
/section/02/feature /25/21/95/index.html
222. Pamela Perun, PuttingAnnuities Back Into Savings Plans,ASPEN INST.
(2004).
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purchase annuities.
The immediate life annuities market is
currently small with annual sales of approximately $6 billion in
2004.223 Also, some advisers argue that 401(k) plans should be
used solely for the accumulation of assets; that it is too confusing
to have income products inside these plans; and that the products
224
lack portability, and are expensive.
Overall two thirds of participants say it is extremely or
somewhat important to arrange for a guaranteed amount of
income during retirement, while only 12% of plan sponsors agree,
225
and 48% say such an option is not important.
When asked if they would change part of their Social Security
benefits for an immediate lump sum, nearly 60% favored the lump
226
sum if it were actuarially fair.
XX. NEW PRODUCTS
Financial institutions have issued new products designed to
reduce the risk that retirees will run out of money. However,
unless the product is a true annuity-i.e., one that guarantees
payments for the retiree's lifetime, or some other period-the risk
is reduced, but not eliminated.
While annuities carry higher expense ratios, their payments are also
guaranteed. With the new products, if the stock or bond market
takes a hit, for example, a fund might have to dip into an investors'
principal to come up with the money for the monthly payment. For
227
that reason, the expectations for the payouts are kept modest.
Research suggests that, generally, individuals should spend
less than 5% of their assets in each year of retirement in order to
have a high likelihood (not an absolute guarantee) of not running
out of money within 30 years. A withdrawal rate of 4% is safe, but
unrealistic. A more realistic 5.5-6% withdrawal rate is more

223. Kaja Whitehouse, Annuities, Meet 401(k)s, WALL ST. J., August 15,
2005, at Al.
224. Lisa Shidler, Annuities for 401(k)s meeting resistance: Some advisers
say the products are confusing, lack portabilityand are expensive, INVESTMENT
NEWS, Oct. 8, 2007, availableat http://www.investmentnews.comapps/pbcs.
dlllarticle?AID=/20071008/FREE/710080329.
225. Spectrem Group, Disconnect, ParticipantsWant Guaranteed Retirement
Income but Sponsors Don't Think It's an Important Plan Option, SPECTREM
GROUP available at
http://www.spectrem.com/trendsandinsights/February
2008/4.html.
226. Jeffery R. Brown et al., Who Values the Social Security Annuity? New
Evidence on the Annuity Puzzle, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, available
at http://www.nber.orglprograms/ag/ rrc/NB0702%2OBrown,Casey,
Mitchell%20FINAL.pdf.
227. News Release, Tim Paradis, Retirement Funds Carry No Guarantee,
(Oct. 9, 2007) (on file with author).
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achievable, but also comes with a 25-30% chance of running out of
money when 75-100% of a portfolio is devoted to stock
228
allocations.
One recent paper points out that much of the earlier research
assumes fixed consumption patterns. 229
Consequently, most
financial planning models are built on the same assumption. 230 In
reality, retirees will see spikes and troughs in their spending
231
patterns over time.
Several major life insurers have recently rolled out variable
annuities that de-emphasize costly life insurance features in favor
of guaranteed long-term withdrawal benefits-a feature once
limited to income annuities. Mutual funds emulate the systematic
withdrawal features of variable annuities without offering
guarantees and their costs.
For example, in April, 2008, John Hancock Retirement Plan
Services launched Guaranteed Income for Life (GIFL), an optional
401(k) rider with a principal guarantee. 232 The plan locks in
233
market gains on the anniversary of each participant's plan.
Thrivent Financial for Lutherans has launched a customized
service, Thrivent Retirement Income Optimizer (TRIO), to help
retirees actively manage their assets and spending in retirement.
Instead of setting up a program that transfers assets to an annuity
or other investments right at retirement, the service is ongoing
throughout retirement, signaling retirees at least annually when it
might be time to reallocate assets, hold invested assets instead of
spending, move some assets
into an inflation-adjusted stream of
234
income, or take no action.
TRIO's guiding principles are diversify assets for growth and
income; guarantee inflation-adjusted income and manage
withdrawals to make money last.
Some researchers advocate delayed (longevity) annuities,
rather than immediate annuities, on the basis that they are more
efficient. 235 There are at least two insurance companies that offer
228. John J. Spitzer, Ph.D., et al., Guidelines for Withdrawal Rates and
Portfolio Safety During Retirement, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL PLANNING, Oct.
2007, available at http://www. fpanet.org/journal/articles/2007_Issues /jfp1007-

art6.cfm.
229. Chris Robinson, Nabil Tahani, Sustainable Retirement Income for the
Socialite, the Gardener and the Uninsured (Atkinson School of Administrative
Studies, York University, (Oct. 25, 2007).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. News Release, John Hancock Retirement Services Officially Launches
New 401(k) GuaranteedIncome for Life Rider, PLAN SPONSOR MAGAZINE, Apr.
9, 2008, available at www.plansponsor.com.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Jason S. Scott et al., Efficient Annuitization with Delayed Payout
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longevity annuities: Retirement Income Insurance from MetLife,
introduced in 2004, and The Hartford Income Security, introduced
in 2006. Longevity annuities that begin payouts after age seventy
may cause problems complying with the required minimum
distribution rules, which generally require payments from
236
employer plans and IRAs to begin at age seventy and a half.
Currently, insurance companies do not even allow the elderly to
purchase longevity annuities with IRA dollars. 237 IRA assets
must first be withdrawn and taxed before being used to purchase a
longevity annuity.238 This is likely to prevent the adoption of
annuitization options. 239 Purchase of a longevity annuity is clearly
consistent with the purposes underlying the minimum distribution
rules, and the regulations should be amended to accommodate this
option.
A life care annuity combines an immediate life annuity with
The latest generation of variable
long-term care insurance.
annuity contracts contains equity put options plus longevity
insurance. The marketing material for these products often claims
that these new riders should induce purchasers to take on more
financial risk.
XXI. SOME RECENT REFORM PROPOSALS
Given the longstanding failure of the private pension system
to expand coverage of lower-income individuals, several reform
proposals have suggested that provision should be made for them
outside the traditional employer-based system by providing lower
income workers with government financed matching credits and
increasing tax benefits for employers who cover all workers in
their organizations. 240
On January 31, 2003, the Bush Administration issued radical
proposals for increasing individual savings which have been

Annuities, PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL (Nov. 2006); see also Martha M.
Hamilton, Live Long and Prosper,WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2007, at F01; Jason S.
Scott, Longevity Annuity: An Annuity for Everyone?, SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH NETWORK (June 2007), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=992423.
236. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9), 403(b)(10), 408(a)(6), § 408(b)(3).
237. Scott, supra note 235.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Daniel I. Halperin & Alicia H. Munnell, How the Pension System
Should Be Reformed, Brookings Institution Conference on ERISA After 25
Years: A Framework for EvaluatingPension Reform, Sept. 1999; see also Peter
R. Orszag, Reforming the Tax Code to Increase Retirement Savings, TAX NOTES
TODAY, May 9, 2006 (recommending a new program providing matching
contributions from the federal government for deposits to 401(k) plans and

IRAs).
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reissued, with minor modifications, each year since then.241 The
main focus is a dramatic expansion of the tax-favored savings
opportunities for those who can afford to save in the first place.
The proposals would dramatically simplify the retirement plan
rules for many employers-however-many commentators feared
that they would also undermine the private pension system. The
proposed plan could reduce incentives for small business owners to
set up 401(k)s, and might even encourage large employers to
2
abandon 401(k)s.24
Some proposals include developing a government authorized
clearinghouse for portable individual accounts, and designing new
multiple employer plans. 243 In June, 2007, the ERISA Industry
Committee ("ERIC") issued a comprehensive reform proposal, The
244
New Benefit Platform for Life Security (the "ERIC Proposal").
ERIC proposes a new structure that would provide benefits
through independent Benefit Administrators, who would compete
based on quality, use of information technology, plan design and
cost. "Benefit Administrators, in many respects, would assume the
role of today's plan sponsors and, particularly with regard to
health care, would be organized on a geographic basis. Employers
and individuals would share funding of benefits. '245 Each Benefit
Administrator would be required to offer plans for a core set of
"lifetime security" benefits: health, retirement and short-term
savings.
Employers could either (1) keep their own benefit plans, or (2)
select one or more Benefit Administrators for their employees and
dependents. Employers could also opt to provide funds to their
employees,
to
buy
benefits
themselves
from
Benefit
Administrators operating in that area. As the benefits would be
administered separately from the employers, an employee could
241. For a description of the most recent version, see Description Of Revenue
Provisions Contained In The President's Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Proposal,
JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, JCS-1-08, (Mar. 2008).
242. Aaron Bernstein, Bush's Retirement Rx Is Bad Medicine, BUSINESS
WEEK ONLINE, Feb. 18, 2003, availableat www.businessweek.com/careers
/content/feb2003/ca20030218 8886ca030.htm; see also Mary Williams Walsh,
Shifting Responsibility for Funding Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at
Al; Robert Greenstein & Joel Friedman, Proposed "Savings Incentives" Would
Cause Revenue Hemorrhage in Future Decades, (Ctr. for Budget and Policy
Priorities, Feb. 5, 2003), available at www.cbpp.org/2-5-03tax.htm ("The
proposal is likely to lead to a reduction in pension coverage for ordinary
workers.").
243. See David A. Pratt, Focus on... Employee Benefit Reform Proposals 15
JOURNAL OF PENSION BENEFITS 1 (discussing in detail a draft of the report).
244. The proposal is available at www.eric.org. As it states on its web site,
ERIC is "dedicated exclusively to representing the employee benefits and
compensation interests of America's major employers."
245. A New Benefit Platform for Life Security, THE ERISA INDUSTRY
COMMITTEE (May 2007).
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stay with the same Benefit Administrator even after changing
jobs, so the new employer could make contributions.
Anyone who does not receive employer-based benefits could
participate equally under the New Benefit Platform, with full
access to plans offered in that area by Benefit Administrators.
"The federal tax consequences for an individual accessing benefits
would be the same whether the benefits were accessed individually
or through an employer. Contributions by employers providing
246
coverage through an administrator would be tax deductible."
The ERIC proposal is a valuable contribution to the debate on
the future of retirement and health plan coverage. Its
shortcomings can, perhaps, be attributed mainly to two causes: the
complexity of the issues, which defy easy solution, and ERIC's
constituency: very large employers who are, as they have been for
some time, no longer convinced that the continued responsibility
for providing employee and retiree benefits is worth the
aggravation and cost. Although the ERIC Proposal would
rationalize the system in many ways, it does not directly address
the central issue: whether universal health or retirement plan
coverage is possible within a voluntary system. The experience of
other countries suggests strongly that the answer is no. Universal
coverage will require some combination of employer mandates
(which will be strongly resisted by small employers), individual
mandates (which may be unaffordable for those above the
increasingly unrealistic official poverty level) and government
subsidies (which will be very expensive).
The principle of equal access for individuals, at equal cost and
with equivalent tax treatment, is important, but difficult to
achieve. The major problem is cost: equal access is meaningless
unless the coverage is affordable, as Massachusetts officials are
now discovering.
The widely publicized problems with the current system of
employer-based retirement and health benefits have led some
commentators to suggest that it is time for a new approach. Susan
Stabile argues that the failures of the employer-based retirement
system cannot be rectified by incremental changes and that:
there are really only two possible models. The first is to jettison the
employer-based system entirely and provide a government pension
[providing a livable pension for all elderly Americans] for everyone.
The second is to retain the employment-based system but move to a
mandatory system with more stringent regulation of defined
247
contribution plans than currently exists.

246. ERIC Proposal, supra note 244.
247. Susan Stabile, Is it Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-based
Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARKL. REV. 305, 325 (2007).
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Katherine Stone argues that the current system of benefits
originated in the industrial era of the twentieth century, when
employers sought to secure a stable workforce, that this employercentered model of benefits has largely outlived its usefulness in
the new "boundaryless" workplace of the twenty-first century, and
that it must be replaced with an alternative that is more portable
248
and more affordable for the vast majority of workers.
Adam Carasso and Jonathan Barry Forman have suggested a
universal pension system (UPS) requiring an annual employer
contribution of 3% of earnings. 249 A UPS, in the long run, would
250
provide retirees with 13-14% more final wages.
The Aspen Institute, through its Initiative on Financial
Security, has recently issued a detailed report, Savings For Life: A
Pathway To Financial Security For All Americans. 251 The report
proposes that savings plans should be (1) targeted towards specific
goals of education, home ownership and retirement, (2) available
to all Americans regardless of income level, (3) simple enough for
all participants to understand, (4) matched by the government,
252
and (5) designed by financial experts in the private sector.
Based on those principles, the report describes
four
complementary savings vehicles: Child Accounts, Home Accounts
and two retirement savings vehicles.
XXII. CONCLUSION
Currently, there are financial products in existence that, if
used in retirement portfolios, can significantly increase the
likelihood of sustained lifelong income. 253
In the short term, policy makers should consider ways of
encouraging plan sponsors to increase participation levels and
make additional distribution options available, and to educate
their participants about financial management in retirement. An
important part of this will be to implement reforms to convince
employers that by doing so they will not increase their fiduciary
exposure or administrative burdens, e.g. by relaxing the well-

248. Katherine V.W. Stone, A FatalMismatch: Employer-centric Benefits in
a Boundaryless World, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 452 (2007).
249. Adam Carasso & Jonathan Barry Forman, Tax Considerations In A
Universal Pension System (UPS), Discussion Paper No. 28, Urban-Brookings
Tax Policy Ctr. (Dec. 20, 2007).
250. Id.
251. Initiative on Financial Security, Savings for Life: A Pathway to
Financial Security For All Americans, ASPEN INST., available at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/%7BDEB6F227-659B-4EC8-8F848DF2
3CA704F5%7D/ SavingsjforLife.pdf.
252. Id. at 8.
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meant but ultimately self-defeating requirements for overly
detailed benefit explanations. In the long term, reforms to enhance
retirement security should form part of the overdue reforms to
Social Security.
ensure the long-term solvency of Medicare and
Improving plan participation and the level of plan benefits is
clearly important. It may also improve the quality of the
employer's workforce and reduce the employer's risk of litigation.

